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Cartel conduct constitutes one of the most serious threats to the maintenance of 
competition in markets. Due to the secretive nature of cartels, and their conduct, they 
are extremely difficult for the Competition Commission1 (‘the Commission’) to detect, 
investigate and prosecute.2 Cartels therefore pose a grave threat to the maintenance of 
competition in markets. Section 4(1)(b) of the Act imposes a per se prohibition on such 
conduct. Consequently, cartel conduct is treated as one of the most serious breaches of 
the Act. 
However, given the nature of the threat posed by cartel conduct to competition 
in markets, it is insufficient that the Act merely considers the deterrence a priority. The 
combined public and private enforcement of the Act has an invaluable role to play in 
the ultimate goal of completely eradicating cartel conduct from markets. The correct 
balance of public and private enforcement of the Act has the potential to form a 
powerful deterrent for cartel members/potential cartel members against participating 
in cartel conduct, by facilitating the effective and efficient detection, investigation, and 
prosecution (accompanied by severe sanctions) of those firms who refuse to abstain 
from cartel conduct. 
In order to assist the public enforcement authorities with the detection, 
investigation, and prosecution of cartels, the Commission developed, in accordance 
with, and after a comparative review of, the leniency policies of other jurisdictions 
competition authorities, a ‘Corporate Leniency Policy’ (‘the CLP’). 3  The aim of the 
CLP is to encourage members of cartels to provide the Commission with information 
in exchange for immunity from prosecution.4  
                                                 
 
1The Competition Commission (‘the Commission’) is established by s19 of the Competition Act 89 of 
1998 (‘the Act’). 
2 The Commission has the power to investigate alleged contraventions of Chapter 2 (s.21(c) of the 
Act), refer matters to the Competition Tribunal (s. 21(g) of the Act) and appear before the Tribunal, as 
required by the Act. By virtue of these provisions the Commission has powers to prosecute cartel 
activities. 
3 The South African Competition Commission’s ‘Corporate Leniency Policy’ (2004). At para 16.1 of 
the CLP the Commission makes note of the fact that in developing the CLP, the Commission 
reviewed and compared the leniency policies adopted by the European Union (EU), Canada, 
Australia, United Kingdom (UK) and United States of America (USA). 




This tool has proven to be instrumental in the competition authorities’ fight to 
thwart cartel conduct. But, a common law class action is now poised to undermine this 
most important public enforcement tool, and in doing so, undermine the effective and 
efficient public enforcement of the Act against cartels. 
The introduction of a common law class action into South African law by the 
High Court in the case of The Trustees for the Time Being of the Children’s Resource 
Centre Trust v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd5 (which was confirmed by the Supreme Court 
of Appeal in Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Foods6) will in theory 
provide the public with a greater degree of access to private redress for damages 
suffered as a result of cartel conduct. However, in its present form, and given its current 
scope of operation, it also poses a significant threat to the CLP, and therefore poses a 
significant threat to the public enforcement authorities’ ability to detect, investigate 
and prosecute cartels. Consequently, by threatening the ability of the competition 
authorities to detect, investigate and prosecute cartels, the common law class action 
may not necessarily lead to increased access to private redress, due to fewer cartels 
being detected. 
The theoretical justification for the introduction of a common law class action 
for damages, namely that they will provide consumers and businesses with far greater 
access to the mechanisms of the Act, by allowing them to ‘get back money that is 
rightfully theirs - as well as acting as a further deterrent to anyone thinking of breaking 
the law’,7 succinctly sums up the appropriate role that class actions for damages should 
play in the enforcement of the Act.  
However, this proposition presupposes that the private enforcement mechanisms 
(class action claims for damages) of the Act are reconcilable with the public 
enforcement mechanisms (the CLP) of the Act. At the present moment these two 
mechanisms are not reconcilable. Therefore private class actions for damages cannot 
fulfil their appropriate role.  
As will become apparent from this dissertation, in order to combat cartel conduct 
successfully, private enforcement of the Act must effectively and efficiently 
                                                 
 
5 2011 JDR 0498 (WCC); [2011] ZAWCHC, (‘Trustees for the time being’).     
6 2013 (2) SA 213 (SCA), (‘Children’s Resource Centre’)  
7 Department for Business Innovation & Skills Government Response ‘Private Actions in Competition 




supplement the public enforcement of the Act. Until this role is realised, cartel conduct 
cannot be successfully prevented. 
At the present moment, the introduction of the common law class action for 
damages undermines, rather than supplements, the public enforcement mechanisms of 
the Act. In particular, the common law class action for damages acts to deter, cartel 
members from applying, rather than encouraging them to apply, for immunity in terms 
of the CLP.  
The British Department of Business, Innovations and Skills (‘BIS’) reiterated 
the importance of establishing a supplementary relationship between these two 
mechanisms. The BIS cautioned, as the United Kingdom seeks to reform the private 
enforcement of competition law in their jurisdiction, that sight must not be lost of the 
fact that: 
‘The possibility of leniency significantly increases the likelihood of detection - and 
ultimately prevention - of cartel conduct. This can also directly benefit private 
claimants, as follow-on actions rely on the detection of anticompetitive behaviour by 
the competition authorities in order to proceed. The Government therefore considers it 
important that the reforms to private actions do not inadvertently undermine the 
leniency regime.’8 
Before the South African competition authorities can begin to quash cartel 
conduct with effectiveness and efficiency, the private and public enforcement 
mechanisms must be reconciled. In my opinion, two prerequisites are required for the 
reconciliation of these mechanisms. Firstly, the institution of private class actions for 
damages resulting from cartel conduct must only be promoted in appropriate 
circumstances. Secondly, safeguards to prevent these class actions from undermining 
the CLP must be put in place.  
It is in order to achieve these prerequisites, I propose the following:  
(1) the introduction of a statutory class action procedure;  
(2) the introduction of a section into the Act, providing for statutory 
recognition of the CLP;  
                                                 
 




(3) the exclusion of the possibility of instituting a claim for civil damages 
against a cartel member who has been granted Total Immunity in terms 
of the CLP, by way of amendment to the Act. 
However, before the implementation of the abovementioned proposal can be 
properly considered, the current position of class actions, the leniency regime, as well 
as the existing interaction of these two concepts must be evaluated. Furthermore, the 
United States of America’s experience regarding the recognition of these two concepts, 
their development, as well as their interaction will be evaluated as a means of 
comparison.  
These evaluations endeavour to establish the necessity of the type of 
amendments which I propose, as well as whether the proposed amendments are 
suitable to achieve the goals stated above. 
Firstly, I will evaluate the current trend in America regarding the recognition of 
the concepts of antitrust class actions for damages and leniency, as well as how the 
interaction of these two concepts is regulated. The aim of this evaluation is to provide 
a point of comparison against which South Africa’s current position can be evaluated, 
by looking at the current trend of the foreign jurisdiction which leads the way in this 
field. After this evaluation is completed, it will be established whether the current 
trends in this comparable jurisdictions are supportive of South Africa’s current 
approach to class actions, as well as leniency, or whether they are suggestive that a 
need exists for a different approach to be followed.  
Secondly, I will briefly discuss the South African pre-constitutional position 
relating to class actions, followed by a similarly brief discussion of the post-
constitutional position (as prescribed by both the Interim Constitution9 and the 
Constitution10) relating to class actions, as well as how the legislature’s stance towards 
this issue was formed.  
Thirdly, the South African trend regarding the recognition of class actions 
outside of the Constitution in the post-constitutional era will be examined. I will 
specifically focus on the recent ground-breaking decision of the High Court, in the 
case of The Trustees for the Time Being, 11 to recognise a common law class action 
                                                 
 
9 The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
10 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 




outside of the Constitution, which was approved by the Supreme Court of appeal in 
the case of Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Foods.12  
Fourthly, the extent and success of the Commission’s use of their CLP, as well 
as the rationale behind such utilisation, as mechanism for counteracting cartels will be 
analysed. This will indicate the CLP’s importance in the successful prosecution of 
cartels by the Commission, and therefore whether it deserves to be protected against 
the potential threats posed to its effective operation by the introduction of a common 
law class action by the court in the two cases referred to above.  
Fifthly, I will establish, at least in my opinion, the central ways in which the 
operation of common law class action will most likely affect the efficient operation of 
the CLP. This aspect will be illustrated by way of a hypothetical case study, wherein 
the position of a firm, whose involvement in the cartel is minimal, and would therefore 
ordinarily be inclined to apply for leniency early in the process, will be examined in 
order to establish the effect that the common law class action has, if any, on such a 
party’s decision to apply for leniency. 
Lastly, in light of the above findings I shall put forward my proposed legislative 
amendments to the Act, providing for a statutory indemnity clause as well as a 
statutory class action, with the aim of ensuring that private enforcement mechanisms 
are extended in appropriate circumstances, without risk of the public enforcement 
mechanisms of the competition authorities being undermined. 
As a point of departure I shall define the concept of a ‘class action’ (establishing 
with the necessary clarity the essential nature of a class action)13 as well as that of the 
term ‘corporate leniency policy’, in order to ascertain the precise boundaries of the 
discussion.  
                                                 
 
12 Children’s Resource Centre supra (n6). 





 ‘Class action’ 
In the case of Children’s Resource Centre14 the Supreme Court of Appeal refers to 
Professor Mulheron’s definition of the concept of a ‘class action’ with approval. 
Mulheron defines the concept of a ‘class action’ as a ‘legal procedure’: 
‘...which enables the claims (or parts of the claims) of a number of persons against the 
same defendant to be determined in the one suit. In a class action, one or more persons 
(representative plaintiff) may sue on his or her own behalf and on behalf of a number of 
other persons (the class) who have a claim to a remedy for the same or a similar alleged 
wrong to that alleged by the representative plaintiff, and who have claims that share 
questions of law or fact in common with those of the representative plaintiff (common 
issues). Only the representative plaintiff is a party to the action. The class members are 
not usually identified as individual parties but are merely described. The class members 
are bound by the outcome of the litigation on the common issues, whether favourable 
or adverse to the class, although they do not, for the most part, take any active part in 
that litigation.’15 
The court goes on to state that the concept of a ‘class action’ performs a further 
function, in that it acts as a ‘representational device’.16 It is:  
‘... a procedural device that expands a court‘s jurisdiction, empowering it to enter a 
judgment that is binding upon everyone with covered claims. This includes claimants 
who, not being named as parties, would not ordinarily be bound. A class wide judgment 
extinguishes the claims of all persons meeting the class definition rather than just those 
of named parties and persons in privity with them, as normally is the case. 
Judges and scholars sometimes treat the class action as a procedure for joining 
absent claimants to a lawsuit rather than as one that permits a court to treat a named 
party as standing in judgment on behalf of them. This is a mistake ... ‘Class members 
neither start out as parties nor become parties when a class is certified.’17 
                                                 
 
14 Children’s Resource Centre supra (n6) at para 16 
15 R Mulheron, The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Perspective (2004) 
3. 
16 Children’s Resource Centre supra (n6) at para 17 
17 C Silver ‘Class Actions-Representative Proceedings’ in B. Bouckaert & G De Geest (eds) 




The court concludes that the nature and scope of a class action, as evidenced by 
the above definitions is: Firstly, a ‘class action’ allows for the aggregation of claims. 
This aspect demands that although not all the claims need to have an identical factual 
or legal basis, they at least need to share common issues of fact or law, which if 
resolved would resolve all the claims, or at least allow for all of the claims to be 
resolved. Secondly, the result of an action brought by way of representation, from a 
requirements point of view, is that it becomes critical to identify those who are being 
represented (at least by description), to identify the representative, to determine 
whether they are suitable to represent the class, and on what basis they will be 
representing the class.18 
If the requirements of the definition are satisfied, the court will certify the class, 
with the result that the representative will have locus standi to conduct the class action 
on behalf of all members of the class.19 
 ‘Corporate leniency policy’ 
There is no express reference to a leniency process by which the Commission can 
indemnify a cartel member from prosecution in the Act itself. However, the 
Commission developed the CLP with the aim of encouraging firms participating in 
cartels to provide the Commission with information in exchange for immunity from 
prosecution.20 This development was embarked on in accordance with, and after the 
comparison and review of, the leniency policies of other jurisdictions’ competition 
authorities.21 The CLP sets out the ‘benefits, procedure and requirements’22 for the 
process by which a self-confessed cartel member can attain immunity for their 
participation in cartel activity, by satisfying the conditions and requirements of the 
CLP.23 Immunity in this framework is defined in paragraph 3.3 of the CLP as meaning 
that: 
                                                 
 
18  Children’s Resource Centre at para (n6) 18 
19 South African Law Commission Report (Project 88) ‘The recognition of class actions and public 
interest actions in South African law’ (1998) 33-34, (‘the Report’) 
20 South African Competition Commission (n3) at para 2.5 
21 See footnote (n3). 
22 South African Competition Commission (n3) at para 2.6 




‘…the Commission would not subject the successful applicant24 to adjudication25 before 
the Tribunal for its involvement in the cartel activity, which is part of the application 
under consideration. Furthermore, the Commission would not propose to have any fines 
imposed to that successful applicant.’26 
The extent of the immunity from prosecution granted in terms of the CLP is 
however qualified. Immunity excludes the applicant who is granted immunity from 
protection against criminal or civil27 liability that results from their participation in the 
cartel conduct which breaches the provisions of the Act. 
It is this qualification that conceivably “opens the door” for the institution of 
criminal sanctions, as well as a common law class action for damages. It is this 
possibility, that not only a member found guilty of cartel conduct by the Tribunal, but 
also a member who has been granted Total Immunity from prosecution in terms of the 
CLP, may yet face criminal and civil sanctions, which threatens to undermine the 
efficient detection, investigation, and prosecution of cartels, by undermining the 
enforcement mechanisms of the Act.28 
 THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
 Introduction 
The United States of America’s historical experience regarding the enforcement of 
antitrust law is both longstanding, and extensive. The interaction that has been 
established between the public and private enforcement of Antitrust law (competition 
law) provides a salient example of what can be achieved, if the correct balance is found 
between providing private persons with redress (by way of class action) in appropriate 
circumstances, and protecting the public enforcement mechanisms (particularly the 
                                                 
 
24 South African Competition Commission (n3) at para 3.3, footnote 4: A ‘Successful applicant’ 
means a firm that meets all the conditions and requirements under the CLP. 
25 South African Competition Commission (n3) at para 3.3, footnote 5: ‘Adjudication’ means a 
referral of a contravention of chapter 2 of the Act to the Tribunal by the Commission with a view of 
getting an Administrative fine imposed on the offender.  
26 South African Competition Commission (n3) at para 3.3 
27 A right to bring a civil claim for damages arising from a prohibited practice comes into existence on 
the date that the Tribunal made a determination in respect of a matter that affects that person, or in 
case of an appeal, on the date that the appeal process in respect of that matter is concluded (see section 
65(9) of the Act). 




Department of Justice’s ‘Corporate Leniency Policy’ (‘the American CLP’)29) used by 
the authorities. 
The recent trend in America in fighting against cartel conduct makes use of the 
‘carrot and stick’ approach. It involves the extensive use of the American CLP (which 
forms the ‘carrot’), in combination with severe sanctions (which form the ‘stick’), both 
public and private (including an antitrust class action for damages). This system has 
attained great success in recent years, due in large part to three main factors. Firstly, 
the granting of immunity is automatic, and the American CLP process is therefore 
predictable and transparent. Secondly, the sanctions are extremely severe. Thirdly, the 
protection offered by immunity is complete, offering protection against any 
prosecution and all of the sanctions that accompany such prosecution. It therefore 
stretches not only to protection against prosecution, criminal fines, and imprisonment, 
but also against antitrust class actions for damages. 
 Class Actions  
(a) Introduction 
In terms of s 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (‘the Sherman Act’),30 cartel conduct is 
prohibited.31 The prohibition is publicly enforced by criminal sanctions. Cartel 
members are subject to felony prosecution and criminal fines in terms of s 1 of the 
Sherman Act.  
To succeed with a public action to prosecute a member for cartel conduct, based 
on a breach of s 1 of the Sherman Act, the Government must prove: (1) the existence 
of a horizontal agreement between two or more separate parties; that (2) unreasonably 
restricts competition, by conspiring to fix prices, restricting output, rigging bids, or 
allocating markets; and (3) affects interstate or foreign commerce.32  
Furthermore, since the enactment of the Sherman Act, private actions for 
damages suffered as a result of cartel conduct are not only allowed, but play a crucial 
                                                 
 
29 U.S. Department of Justice, Corporate Leniency Policy (Aug. 10, 1993) 
30 Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890; as amended by the Antitrust Penalties and Procedures Act of 
1974; as amended by Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004. 
31 The Sherman Act (n30) s1: ‘[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
hereby declared to be illegal.’ 
32 BE Sweeney ‘Defining antitrust violations in the United State’ in Albert A. Foer, Randy Stutz (eds) 




role in the enforcement of anti-trust laws in U.S. The provision of a private action for 
damages is, to a large degree, viewed as an extension of the public enforcement 
mechanism, furthering the interests of the public, rather than simply a means of 
providing private relief. The Supreme Court recognised this function in the case of 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc,33 when the court stated that: 
‘The purpose of giving private parties treble-damages34...was not merely to provide 
private relief, but was to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws.’35 
In order to succeed with private action for damages suffered as a result of cartel 
conduct, a private party must prove, in addition to the three requirements listed above, 
that he (4) has been ‘injured in his business or property’36 by the cartel conduct in 
question. Thereafter the party may bring an action for treble damages.  
Notably, it is not required that a cartel member be found guilty of cartel conduct 
in terms of the Sherman Act, or indeed that the Antitrust Division has even launched 
an investigation into the suspected cartel conduct for a private party to institute a claim 
for damages . So long as the requirements listed above are met, a private action for 
treble-damages may be instituted, irrespective of whether a member has been found 
guilty of cartel conduct (as a follow-on action) or not (as a non-follow-on action).  
However, if private antitrust claims for damages are to fulfil the role of enforcing 
antitrust law effectively, as envisaged by Congress and the Supreme Court, the 
Americans realised early on that claims instituted in multiple courts by multiple 
parties, against the same defendants, must be combined into one or at least fewer 
claims, in order for private enforcement of antitrust law to be feasible and efficient.37 
Therefore U.S law provides for a mechanism which enables related claims to be 
aggregated into class actions.38  
                                                 
 
33 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc 395 U.S. 100 (1969) 
34 The treble-damage remedy is provided to private parties by Congress, and entitles a party to claim 
three times the value of damage that they have suffered. 
35 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc supra (n34)130-131, 133 
36 Section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 (15 U.S.C.) 
37 J Douglas Richards, MB Eisenkraft &AE Shafroth ‘Class Actions’ in Albert A. Foer, Randy Stutz 
(eds) Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the United States: A Handbook (2012)109 




(b) The requirements for the certification of a class action seeking damages 
In the U.S., class actions are governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Rule provides for three types of class actions, one of which is a class 
action for damages.39 Rule 23 provides an extensive procedural framework within 
which a class action must be certified and conducted.  
In order for a class action for damages to be certified, the cumulative 
requirements set out in Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3) must first be satisfied. In terms of Rule 
23(a) and 23(b)(3) it is required that:  
(1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;  
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;  
(3) the claims or defences of the representative parties are typical of the claims 
or defences of the class;  
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class;  
(5) the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members; and  
(6) a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy.  
Rule 23 ‘creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the 
specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action.’40 Therefore if the requirements 
of Rule 23 are met, then the class must be certified. The court is afforded no discretion 
in this regard; certification is automatic. 
The requirements for certification in their current form, as listed above, are a 
product of the 1966 revision of Rule 23.41 Importantly, this revision was enacted in the 
belief that class actions would only be invoked in the context of asserting civil rights 
claims and contesting segregation. 42 Consequently the focus of the revision was 
                                                 
 
39 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (b)(3). 
40 Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co. 559 U. S. (2010) 4 
41 See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (a)-(h). 
42 Prepared Statement of John P. Frank, Hearings on S. 353 Before the Sub Commission on 
Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Commission Of the Judiciary, 106th (Cong 
1999): ‘If there was a single, undoubted goal of the committee, the energizing force which motivated 
the whole rule, it was the firm determination to create a class action system which could deal with 




simply to enable more cases to be certified as class actions, more easily, as this was 
the most efficient way to decide cases of this nature.43  
 However, after the introduction of the revised American CLP by the Department 
of Justice (‘DOJ’), a class action ‘boom’ has been experienced in the private 
enforcement of antitrust law in the context of cases of cartel conduct. The problem is 
that although the courts have encouraged such cases to be brought as class actions, 44  
they remain very different from the desegregation civil rights cases around which the 
revised Rule 23 was framed. 
Rule 23 was not designed to provide a procedure for antitrust class actions for 
damages, and the current trend regarding the certification a class action seeking 
damages seems to reflect defence counsels’ increasing affinity for taking advantage of 
this as a ‘defence’ against antitrust class action claims for damages. 
(c) Current trend regarding the certification of a class action seeking damages 
In recent years the trend in the approach of the courts towards the use of class actions 
in the private enforcement of antitrust law, has become far less favourable. The most 
profound manifestation of this turnaround is to be found in the approach of the courts 
in relation to the determination of whether the certification requirements for a class 
have been satisfied or not. 
The requirements for certification have historically not been at all contentious 
(save, perhaps, the predominance requirement). However, the recent judgments of the 
various courts are fostering controversy and confusion around the question of what is 
required in order for the certification requirements of Rule 23 to be met. 
This seems to be a direct result of a deliberate tactic of defence counsels, to 
discourage the private enforcement of antitrust law by way of class action which, 
worryingly, is being entertained, and at times even supported, by the courts, in 
circumstances where class actions are appropriate. For example: 
                                                 
 
43 J Resnik, ‘From “Cases” to “Litigation”’ (1991) 54 Law and Contemporary Problems 9 
44 Hon G. Calabresi ‘Class actions in the U.S. Experience: the legal perspective’ in J G. Backhaus, A 
Cassone & G B. Ramello (Eds) The Law and Economics of Class Actions in Europe: Lessons from 
America (2012) 15: The decisions of the Supreme Court 1970’s and 1980’s supported a wider spread 
of application of class actions for damages, as a general means of providing redress to individuals who 
otherwise would not have been able to bring their claim. The court was of the opinion that class 
actions saved resources (Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979) 701-702), protected the interests 
of absentees, spread the cost of litigation, by avoiding multiplicity of claims (United States Parole 
Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1988) 402-403) and encouraged settlement. Thus trial courts were 





Traditionally the commonality requirement45 is satisfied by the plaintiffs’ need to 
plausibly plea unlawful conduct.46  However, in the recent case of Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Dukes47 the court upset the status quo, deciding that the commonality 
requirement is only satisfied when the class’s claims ‘depend on a common contention’ 
and the ‘determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the 
validity of each of the claims in one stroke.’48 Whilst the applicability of this judgment 
going forward is debatable,49 it none the less illustrates the courts’ willingness to allow 
class actions to be disrupted at the certification stage (on the basis of a failure to satisfy 
the commonality requirement), despite the existence of lengthy precedent in favour of 
concluding that the commonality requirement is satisfied despite the absence of such 
a common contention. 
(ii) Typicality 
The typicality requirement50 is usually easily satisfied in cases involving price fixing. 
In such cases consumers normally suffer the damages in the same way, from the same 
conduct of the defendant, due to increased prices in the market. However, counsel for 
the defence has begun to developed ways of creating an apparent divergence of 
interests between claimants, in an effort to reduce the number of claimants. In Dieter 
v. Microsoft Corporation51 the court excluded Enterprise Purchasers from the class on 
the basis that they, as opposed to individual purchasers, purchased licenses at prices 
unique to each purchase. 
(iii) Predominance 
Given that the predominance52 requirement has historically been the most contested 
requirement in antitrust class action cases for damages, it is unsurprising that defence 
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counsels in recent decisions, have adopted this requirement as the spearhead for 
arguing for the refusal to certify class actions. Consequently a number of recent 
proposed class actions have been refused certification on the basis of a failure to satisfy 
the predominance requirement. In the process counsel and courts have fostered 
‘widespread and deep confusion concerning basic principles governing predominance 
analysis.’53 Defendants have begun to challenge (admittedly, with varying success), 
what were established definitions, such as what constitutes ‘individual issues’ 54and 
‘predominance’55 in the context of Rule 23(b)(3). 
In antitrust cases involving price fixing it is common for a few members of a 
class not to have suffered a loss purely for personal reasons. In the past it was widely 
accepted that the presence of a small number of such members in a class would not 
prevent certification of the class.56 However, the court in In re New Motor Vehicles57 
was of the opinion that the plaintiff did indeed need to prove that all of the members 
of the class suffered damage as a result of the price fixing. Consequently, the presence 
of a group of members which the plaintiff could not prove had suffered damage, albeit 
only due to their personal reasons, precluded the certification of the entire class. 
Notably, such reasoning precludes almost every antitrust class action for damages 
relating to price fixing from certification. 
Rule 23(b)(3)(D), identifies ‘the likely difficulties in managing a class action’ as 
a factor to be considered in the predominance enquiry. There is clear authority that 
‘managing a class action’ relates to the managing of a class action at trial.58 Therefore 
issues that can be resolved prior to trial should not form part of the considerations 
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lesser overall significance and they must be manageable in a single class action.’ 
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when determining predominance.59 Despite this, recent case law has produced a 
number of instances where issues that can be dealt with at pretrial have been included 
as evidence of a lack of predominance of common questions.60 
(iv) Conclusion 
It is my belief that the turnaround in approach (particularly of the courts) can in large 
be attributed as a response to two factors: first, the undeniably detrimental effect that 
class actions for damages in general have had on the American economy; 61 second, 
the fact that Rule 23 was not designed to conduct large class action claims for damages 
in the context of antitrust law. The procedure provided by Rule 23 is simply not 
sufficient to deal effectively and efficiently with these types of class actions. 
Consequently the manifestations of the change in approach shown by the courts and 
counsel can be seen as being the product of procedure that is simply inadequate. They 
give evidence of the confusion, loss of efficiency and loss of effectiveness that results 
where class action procedures are not adequately provided for in statute or Court Rules. 
I do not believe that the change in approach is due to a perception that class 
actions are ill-suited for the effective and efficient enforcement of antitrust law. Class 
actions have proved successful in America not only in providing an efficient way to 
provide for private redress, but also in fulfilling important public enforcement 
functions. 
The American experience illustrates that class actions play a significant role in 
the public enforcement of antitrust law on two levels. Firstly, the threat of a class action 
for treble-damages provides a burly deterrent from, and punishment for, cartel conduct, 
increasing the size of the sanctioning ‘stick’ available. Secondly, the threat of antitrust 
class actions for damages sweetens the ‘carrot’ of applying for corporate leniency (due 
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to the fact that the American CLP provides for the exclusion of the possibility of 
instituting private claims for treble damages against successful leniency applicants).  
 The CLP 
(a) Introduction 
In 1978, the DOJ introduced the American CLP62, in an effort to more effectively and 
efficiently detect, investigate and prosecute cartels. The main thrust of the American 
CLP was providing applicants the possibility of reduced administrative fines, and 
amnesty from criminal prosecutions under the Sherman Act, 63  in return for their 
complete cooperation with the Antitrust Division. However, the application of the 
1978 American CLP was inherently unpredictable, and therefore failed to attract 
applicants.  
This position has changed immeasurably since 1993, when a revision of the 
American CLP, aimed at making it easier and more attractive to apply for leniency, 
was undertaken by the Antitrust Division. The revision resulted in three major 
changes:64  
(1) Immunity is automatic before an investigation has begun (provided six 
conditions are met.).65 
(2) Immunity can be attained after an investigation has begun (provided seven 
conditions are complied with.).66  
(3) All directors, officers, and employees of the corporation who admit their 
involvement in the illegal antitrust activity will not be charged criminally 
for the illegal activity.67  
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The former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement 
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, S D Hammond, is of the opinion 
that there are three pillars that must first be in place before any jurisdiction’s CLP can 
be enforced efficiently, and consequently, before any jurisdiction’s antitrust law can 
be enforced effectively: 
(1) The CLP must be transparent and predictable, so that cartel members can 
accurately predict how they will be treated if they choose to self-report, or 
fail to do so.  
(2) Cartel members must perceive the threat of detection to be high, if they do 
not self-report.  
(3) The antitrust law must provide severe sanctions for cartel members who do 
not self-report, and complete reprieve from such sanctions for those who are 
first to self-report.68 
(b) Transparency and predictability 
The revised American CLP has successfully increases the transparency and 
predictability of the program. This has been achieved principally by making the 
granting of immunity automatic upon compliance with the requirements of the 
American CLP. Consequently, confidence in the predictability of the treatment that 
cartel members will receive in terms of the program has grown dramatically. As a 
result, the Antitrust Division has enjoyed a ‘nearly twenty-fold increase in the leniency 
application rate, making the Leniency Program the Antitrust Division’s most effective 
investigative tool.’ 69 
(c) Perception of likelihood of detection 
In order for a CLP to effectively destabilise a cartel, the threat of detection must be 
perceived to be imminent. In this regard the American authorities make use of a 
number of different investigative tools in their investigation of cartels. Tools such as 
wire taps, search warrants, border watches, and more recently INTERPOL Red Notices 
and extradition requests are regularly used to assist the Antitrust division in gathering 
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evidence against cartel members, providing further incentive for cartel members to 
self-report, and avoid prosecution.  
However, the number one driver of self-reporting remains the American CLP, 
which creates a perceived threat of detection among cartel members, albeit not in the 
traditional ways of the other tools. The American CLP creates a perceived threat of 
detection by increasing the incentives of firms to self-report, which increases the risk 
for firms in the cartel that another member may self-report, and in doing so, expose 
the activities of the other firms to investigation by the competition authorities. 
(d) Criminal & Civil Sanctions and the possibility of immunity 
If the potential sanctions of being convicted of cartel conduct do not outweigh the 
gains realised by cartel members from the cartel conduct in question, sanctions are 
simply perceived as a cost of doing business, rather than a deterrent. The perceived 
threat of detection also ceases to have its desired effect where the potential sanctions 
for being detected do not perform the requisite deterrent function. 
The Antitrust Division makes use of criminal antitrust corporate fines, individual 
criminal antitrust fines, as well as individual jail sentences to sanction offenders. 
Furthermore, the American CLP also provides for the possibility of the institution of 
private claims for treble damages for damage suffered as a result of cartel conduct. 
However, for a number of reasons, this part of the dissertation will only focus on the 
monetary sanctions employed by the American competition authorities to thwart cartel 
conduct.70 
The Antitrust Division has ‘steadfastly emphasized the importance of …stiff 
corporate fines to induce leniency applications and optimize deterrence of cartel 
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conduct.’ The trend in reform over the past (almost) thirty years reflects this belief. 
Over the past (almost) thirty years America has seen exponential increases in the 
maximum limitations of monetary sanctions.71 In addition, since 1984, a fine of up to 
twice the amount gained by, or twice the loss caused by, the cartel, is allowed in certain 
circumstances, and in spite of the prescribed maximum fines.72  
This trend has provided a ‘stick’ of exponentially increasing size, with which the 
Antitrust Division is able to deter firms from cartel conduct and punish cartel members 
who fail to self-report. However, these fines alone are not sufficient to effectively deter 
and punish cartel conduct. When monetary penalties are awarded against large 
companies (particularly large international companies), the fines on average only 
constitute 4% to 13% of affected sales, which is simply too small a sanction to achieve 
the desired deterrent effect, and is likely to be treated as a cost of doing business.73  
The task of adding to the size of this ‘stick’ has therefore been given to the 
private enforcement tools of the act, namely antitrust class action claims for damages. 
The most notable in this regard has been the trend of exponentially increasing 
settlement/award amounts in antitrust class action damages claims. Private damages 
recoveries amounted to $38.7 billion for the period between 1990 and August 2012, 
and accounted for 93% of worldwide private damages recoveries over the same 
period.74  
Although the nature of the way in which settlements are classified makes it 
difficult to accurately establish a trend in the increase of private class action damages 
recoveries, 75 by looking at the increase in the largest settlements since 1998, a clear 
trend emerges. Initially, settlement amounts increase slowly, resulting in a cumulative 
amount of $300 million in damages being recovered up until 1997. However, from 
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1998 onwards, where just over $1 billion in damages was recovered in the In re 
NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation,76 the trend in the amounts being 
recovered through private actions increase exponentially.77 In 2000, $1.85 billion was 
recovered in the settlement with the five largest tobacco manufacturers. In 2003, $3.38 
billion was recovered in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc78 (the first of three 
settlements in the bank cards’ transaction fee cartel cases). In 2008, $6.65 billion was 
recovered by AmEx & Discover from Visa and MasterCard, in the second of the bank 
cards’ transaction fees cases. In 2012, $7.8 billion was recovered in In re Payment 
Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation79 (the last of the 
three settlements in the bank cards’ transaction fee cartel cases). 
As a result of these increasingly severe sanctions, the U.S. has seen monetary 
penalties (criminal fines and private claims for damages) for cartel conduct exceed $50 
billion for the first time in 2012, and accounting for 50% of the total worldwide 
antitrust penalties for the same period.80  
It is therefore the addition of private damages claims and administrative penalties 
that provides the true ‘severity’ to these sanctions. Notably, the compilation of these 
monetary penalties is not what one might expect. The compilation illustrates the 
enormous role that antitrust class actions for damages now play in the public 
enforcement of antitrust law in America. The criminal antitrust fines for cartel conduct 
imposed by the DOJ make up a comparatively meagre $11.2 billion of the total 
monetary penalties, when compared with the reported settlements received through 
antitrust class actions for damages, which amount to $ 41.8 billion dollars.81  
However, severity of monetary penalties alone does not necessarily provide a 
sufficient deterrent against cartel conduct. Whether monetary penalties act as a 
deterrent depends on their ability to disgorge the profits made by firms from cartel 
monopolistic conduct. The greater the disgorgement, the greater the deterrent effect 
the monetary penalty will have.  In order to determine the extent of disgorgement, the 
damage ratio must be calculated. The damage ratio indicates the percentage of 
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damages disgorged by the fines,82private damages,83 or both, and therefore determines 
their effectiveness of the penalties as deterrents. 
 
From a sample of 45 international cartels convicted in America of price-fixing, 
Connor84 established that U.S. fines alone disgorged, on average, approximately 42% 
of the profits derived from the cartel activity in the U.S.85 However, when viewed in 
combination with the average disgorgement of 30% of the profits derived from the 
cartel activity by antitrust class actions for damages, an average of 90% of the profits 
obtained through cartel conduct were successfully disgorged by U.S. monetary 
penalties.86 Therefore it is clear that a combination of private and public sanctions is 
necessary to ensure that sanctions are not only perceived as providing severe 
punishment, but also a successful deterrent to cartel conduct. 
While sanctions form the ‘stick’ of the Antitrust Division’s system of enforcing 
antitrust laws against cartels, given the inherent nature of cartel conduct, a ‘carrot’ is 
needed in order to create an opportunity for the ‘stick’ to be used. The ‘carrot’ must induce 
cartel members to self-report, and assist the Antitrust Division in detecting, investigating, 
and prosecuting cartels. This carrot is provided by the American CLP, and more 
specifically the recognition therein given to the concept of ‘full immunity’.  
There are three key factors of the revised American CLP, which inform the 
concept of ‘full immunity’, and provide the American CLP with the perceived 
transparency and predictability necessary to entice cartel members to self-report. The 
three factors can be summarised as follows:  
(1) the American CLP provides a successful applicant with automatic 
immunity;  
(2) immunity can be attained before an investigation is instituted, as well as 
afterwards;  
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(3) Immunity exempts the firm, its directors, and its employees from 
prosecution, and all of the abovementioned sanctions, including antitrust 
class actions for damages.87  
Whilst prosecutors were initially uneasy with the idea of allowing cartel 
members to escape prosecution, and the sanctions that went with it, the ‘Antitrust 
Division recognized that the grant of full immunity was necessary to induce cartel 
participants to turn on each other and self-report…’88 And, given the success of this 
policy, I suspect that the prosecutors no longer harbour such apprehensions.  
When the prospect that ‘full immunity’ only applies to the first applicant is 
combined with sufficiently severe sanctions (which as has been illustrated above 
necessarily consists of both public sanctions and private sanctions), the concept of the 
‘stick’ and ‘carrot’ comes together, to form an effective and efficient complete 
enforcement mechanism, capable of successfully deterring firms from participating in 
cartel conduct. 
 The sanctions reinforce the benefits of applying for leniency; while the 
provision of ‘full immunity’ to the first successful applicant reinforces the 
consequences of not applying for leniency (i.e. the possibility of facing severe 
sanctions).  
Furthermore, by excluding the possibility of instituting antitrust class action 
claims for damages against a successful applicant, a balance is struck between 
protecting the efficient operation of the American CLP, and with it the public 
enforcement of antitrust laws, (if a successful applicant is able to escape civil claims, 
he is more likely to self-report), and the private enforcement of antitrust law (by 
allowing private parties to seek redress in appropriate circumstances). This ultimately 
leads to a complete enforcement system, which is balanced, and therefore effective 
and efficient. 
The facilitated interaction of the American CLP and the sanctions (both public 
and private) for participating in cartel conduct, has allowed the American competition 
authorities to destabilize cartels to such a degree that applying for leniency is likely to 
be perceived as a necessity rather than a choice in the near future. 
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     Conclusion  
There are many lessons that can be drawn from the American experience. The balanced 
and efficient approach that the U.S. employs in the enforcement of antitrust laws to 
combat cartel conduct in particular provides some useful and positive lessons towards 
assessing South Africa’s approach to these concepts. 
Firstly, public enforcement mechanisms (spearheaded by the American CLP) 
and the public sanctions provided by antitrust laws alone are insufficient to combat 
cartel conduct effectively and efficiently. There exists a need for concurrent (and 
complementary) private enforcement of antitrust laws, in order to deter firms from 
participating in cartel conduct, and punish firms who fail to be deterred from 
participating in cartel conduct, effectively. 
Secondly, for the private enforcement of antitrust laws by way of civil claims for 
damages to be effective, efficient, and feasible, these claims must be brought as class 
actions. In this regard, Rule 23 provides a comprehensive procedure for the institution 
of an antitrust class action for damages.   
Thirdly, a balance must be achieved between the public enforcement 
mechanisms and the private enforcement mechanism if the overall enforcement of 
antitrust laws is to be effective and efficient. It is imperative to the success of the public 
enforcement of antitrust laws that the antitrust class action for damages procedure 
complements the American CLP’s functioning as the primary tool of the competition 
authorities for detecting, investigating, and prosecuting cartels. This necessitates that 
the threat of the institution of class actions does not deter cartel members from 
applying for leniency, but induces them to apply. At the same time, private parties 
must have recourse to institute such class actions where it is appropriate (otherwise 
they may simply refuse to partake in the private enforcement of antitrust laws). Such 
a balance is achieved by the provision for ‘full immunity’ in the American CLP. 
However, there are certain elements of the American experience which should 
be deal with, with prudence. The question as to the suitability of Rule 23 to provide 
the procedure for antitrust class actions for damages is one such element. 
As discussed above, the revised rule 23 was enacted in the belief that class 




contesting segregation. 89 The problem with antitrust class action for damages is that 
they are very different from the desegregation civil rights cases around which the 
revised Rule 23 was framed and designed to operate.  
Given the historical framing of Rule 23, the widespread criticism of its direct 
application to regulate antitrust law class actions for damages, as well as the recent 
trend regarding the certification of class actions seeking damages, I question the 
appropriateness of Rule 23, as well as the verbatim adoption of its provisions by the 
court in the Children’s Resource Centre case, to regulate antitrust class action claims 
for damages. 
 
 THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 
 Class Actions 
(a) Introduction 
Private claims for damages resulting from cartel conduct were practically non-existent 
in South Africa prior to the recognition of class actions in matters outside of the 
Constitution. This is chiefly due to the fact that the harm caused by cartel conduct is 
usually of such a nature that the damage suffered by the individuals is too small to 
warrant the adjudication of an individual claims.  
It can therefore be said that private claims for damages played no consequential 
role in the enforcement of the Act, and had no effect (either positive or negative) on 
the operation of the CLP prior to the recognition of a common law class action outside 
of Constitutional matters, and therefore within competition matters, by the High Court 
in the case of Trustees for the Time Being. 90 
Historically, in the Pre-Constitutional era, the concept of the class action in the 
American form91 was an unknown procedure in South African common law.92 The 
traditional position regarding standing was, that, excepting the very limited scope of a 
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voluntary association’s locus standi to act on behalf of its members, collective actions 
were not allowed in South African law.93 In order for a litigant to acquire the requisite 
standing to litigate on behalf of another, and for that other person to be bound by the 
judgment, joinder had to take place.94 In order for a valid joinder to occur two 
requirements had to be satisfied. First, the litigant had to show a sufficiently direct and 
substantial interest in the case.95 Secondly, the party on behalf of whom he wished to 
litigate was required to be joined as a co-litigant by way of a prescribed joinder 
procedure.96 
Therefore outside of joinder there was no procedure which allowed for a 
representative to act on behalf of another. Moreover there was no procedure 
whatsoever through which a person’s rights and interests could be determined, unless 
they were a party to the proceedings. This position was altered in constitutional matters 
by the advent of the Constitutional era.97 
(b) The possibility of certifying a class action for damages for damage caused by         
cartel conduct, prior to the case of Children’s Resource Centre 98 
The Interim Constitution gave rise to the first legislative recognition of the concept of 
a class action in South African law regarding standing, but only in constitutional 
matters.99 The result was that South Africa’s common law substantive position 
regarding class actions underwent substantial changes.100 However in a jurisdiction 
such as South Africa, where substantive law originates from Roman Dutch law, and 
procedural law originates from English law, it is important that the introduction of 
substantive law concepts are met either by existing commensurate procedural 
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provisions, or by the introduction of such provisions, to facilitate the proper 
functioning of the substantive law being introduced. For instance, the U.S. introduced 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Court to regulate the procedure regarding the 
institution of class actions in Federal courts. This was not done in South Africa. 
Therefore class actions under the Interim Constitution had a very limited scope of 
application, and in addition their usefulness was marred by a lack of adequate 
procedural provisions.  
The pressure for the scope of class actions to be extended beyond constitutional 
matters gained traction in the mid-nineties. Influenced largely by the position in 
comparable foreign jurisdictions, which, led by the United States, had all provided for 
such a class action (either in legislation or court rules) by this time, the South African 
Law Commission (‘the Law Commission’) prepared a ‘Working Paper’101 in 1995 
recommending the adoption of a class action outside of constitutional matters. 
 In the Working Paper the Law Commission recommended the introduction of a 
class action, and class action procedure,102 throughout civil litigation by way of an Act 
of Parliament.103 This recommendation went unchallenged.104 The suggested 
procedure was modelled largely within the well-established mould of the American 
model of class action proceedings. 105It is clear that the Commission was of the opinion 
that firstly it was necessary, given the inadequate provision for class actions in the 
s7(4) of the interim Constitution,106 to introduce a class action in matters outside of the 
Constitution by way of legislation; and secondly that it should not be left to the courts 
to develop the necessary guidelines, principles and procedures to accompany the 
introduction of such a class action.107 
The legislature did not follow the proposals of the Law Commission to extend 
the scope of class actions when promulgating s38 of the Constitution, and instead 
preferred the same formulation as s7(4) of the Interim Constitution. Section 38 of the 
Constitution states: 
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‘Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that 
a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant 
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a 
court are - 
(a) anyone acting in their own interest; 
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own   
     name; 
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of  
     persons; 
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; 
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members.’ 
If the wording of s38 of the  Constitution is given its ordinary meaning (in line 
with the rules of interpretation) it is apparent that the class action described in s38 of 
the  Constitution can only be invoked to enforce a right entrenched in the bill of 
rights.108  
Notably, the procedure for such invocation is not dealt with in the s38, or 
elsewhere in the Constitution. Instead, the procedure to be followed in order to enforce 
constitutional rights by way of a class action brought in terms of s38(c) of the 
Constitution was developed by the courts. Specifically, Froneman J in his court a quo 
judgment in the case of Ngxuza and Others v Permanent Secretary, Department of 
Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Others,109 which was confirmed on appeal in Cameron 
JA’s judgment in the Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of Ngxuza.110 
The court a quo developed, and the court of appeal accepted, guideline 
requirements for the invocation of a class action in terms of s38 of the Constitution, 
which mirrored the requirements of Rule 23 (a) of the US Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, as well as the recommendations of the Law Commission. 111 In addition, 
Froneman J expelled the practical objections to such a procedure relating to the 
‘floodgates objection’112, as well as the ‘classification problem’.113 The guideline 
requirements established by Froneman J, as well as his opinion regarding the practical 
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objections to the procedure for class actions, were supported by the court in the 
subsequent case of Firstrand Bank Limited v Chaucer Publications (Pty) Limited.114 
A possible criticism of this approach to the procedure to be followed in class 
actions, is that such an adoption requires the judges of the superior courts to exercise 
their discretion in each case, and to regulate the guidelines (set out by the court a quo 
in Ngxuza v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape) as applicable 
to the particular s 38115 class action case brought before them.116 By leaving the 
subsequent development of the procedure to be followed in class action cases to the 
courts, the problem of a ‘lack of uniformity and consistency of approach’117 can arise, 
and has arisen in the superior courts. This problem forms one of the reasons why I 
submit that a similar approach should not be followed when developing a class action 
procedure outside of the Constitution (This aspect will be dealt with in greater detail 
in Chapter 4, paragraph I, sub-paragraph (e)). 
It is thus clear that both the Interim and Final constitutions provide for class 
actions in the context of constitutional matters.118 However, neither have abolished the 
common law regarding standing in matters outside of constitutional matters.119 
Furthermore, from the Ngxuza judgment it is clear that the courts will apply the 
American style procedure to class actions brought in terms of s38(c) of the 
Constitution, but no legislation regarding the procedure to be followed has been 
promulgated.  
Therefore, prior to the case of Children’s Resource Centre, it was unclear as to 
how provision would be made for a class action outside of constitutional matters, and 
therefore within the realm of competition law, and how such a class action would be 
regulated, procedurally. 
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(c) The possibility of certifying a class action for damages for damage caused by 
cartel conduct, after Children’s Resource Centre: 
In 1998, after it became apparent that the class action redress offered by both the 
Constitution and its predecessor was inadequate,120  the Law Commission submitted a 
report, entitled The recognition of class actions and public interest actions in South 
African law (‘the Report’), to the Minister of Justice for his consideration. In the 
Report, the Law Commission, based on their earlier Working Paper, submitted that 
there was an urgent need for legislation introducing a class action throughout civil 
litigation,121 as well as rules of court to provide a special procedure for class actions 
outside of the Constitution.122 The recommendations of the Law commission, in brief, 
are as follows:123 
(1) The principles underlying class actions should be introduced by way of 
legislation, while the necessary procedures should be introduced by way of 
rules of court. The Commission was of the opinion that even though it is 
possible to leave the development of a class action outside of constitutional 
matters to the courts,124 it should not be left to the courts alone due to their 
propensity to follow approaches which lacked uniformity and consistency. 
(2) The act should define the term ‘class action’. The definition should provide for 
the concept of a general class action, rather than categories of class actions. 
(3) The person instituting the class action as representative need not be a member 
of the class. 
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(4) A preliminary application for the certification of a class action must be made, 
requesting leave to institute a class action proceeding and to ask for directions 
as to procedure.  
(5) The commission set out suggested requirements that the courts should consider 
in deciding whether a certification application is likely to succeed: 
a. whether the class of persons are identifiable; 
b. whether a cause of action is disclosed; 
c. whether there are issues of fact common to the class; 
d. whether a suitable representative is available; 
e. whether the interests of justice will be served; and 
f. whether the class action is the most appropriate method of proceeding 
with the action. 
(6) The court should be given a wide discretion in determining the procedure to be 
followed in the application for certification. 
(7) The piece of legislation should deal with the questions of when, by whom, to 
whom, and how notice should be given. In general notice must be given to 
members of the class and prospective members. However the court should have 
the discretion to make opt-in, opt-out or no notice orders. 
(8) In general the court’s decision binds all members of the class. However the 
court should be afforded discretion in respect of the binding effect of its 
judgment on the members of the class. 
(9) For a class action to be instituted there must be issues of fact or law common 
to all members. However the existence of further issues which will require 
individual determination should not pose a threat to certification.  
(10) If a claim for damages is instituted by way of class action, the court may make 
an aggregate assessment or individual assessments. The Act should make 
provision for the disposal of any undistributed residue of an aggregate award. 
(11) The court should retain its discretion to apply the general rule that costs follow 
the result.  
(12) A legal practitioner may, subject to the Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997, enter 
into a contingency fee arrangement with the representative, in which case the 
payment of his fees and disbursements, by the class members, are contingent 




(13) In order to settle, the parties must first obtain the consent of the court. 
(14) The decision to certify an action as a class action should not be subject to 
appeal. However the decision not to certify should be subject to an appeal. 
These recommendations are almost identical to the provisions set out in Rule 
23(a) of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Responses to the recommendations 
of the Law Commission have largely been positive from academic commentators.125 
However the legislature has not yet shared the Law Commission’s enthusiasm for the 
introduction of a class action outside of constitutional matters. Consequently, there is 
no legislation at present regulating class actions outside of Constitutional matters, and 
therefore in competition law matters. 
Perhaps the legislature’s hesitancy stems from the potential threat that the 
introduction of an unrestricted class action poses to the entire economic sector.126 
There is much to be said for this view, and as seen above, the American economy has 
suffered dearly as a result of the introduction of the unrestricted class action. Class 
actions have unusually large financial stakes, and therefore possess the potential to 
transfer large amounts of wealth and even compel the restructuring of important 
institutions. 
 For purposes of this dissertation, I will concentrate on the large two-dimensional 
threat posed to the economic sector by unrestricted class actions in the competition 
law sphere:  
(1) Directly, via the potential created for large claims, by potentially large 
classes, based on breaches of the Act.  
(2) Indirectly, by threatening to undermine the operation of the Commission’s 
CLP (Which, represents the most important tool possessed by the 
Commission in protecting markets against anti-competitive behaviour in the 
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form of cartel conduct. And as submitted in the introductory paragraph, was 
not threatened by individual damages claims.). 
Thus the consequential economic and policy implications of an unrestricted class 
action are complex, highly problematic, and may well justify the legislature’s 
tentativeness towards introducing legislation recognising such class actions. 
However, despite the possibility of legitimate reasons for the legislature’s 
inaction, the court a quo in the case of The Trustees for the Time Being127 recognised 
a common law class action outside of constitutional matters. The Appeal Court in the 
case of Children’s Resource Centre was subsequently of the opinion that given the 
constitutional endorsement of the class action in s38 of the Constitution, and the failure 
to pass legislation dealing with the issue, the court was obliged to invoke its inherent 
power to protect and regulate its own process to develop the common law in this 
regard, in the interests of justice.128  
The facts of  the Children’s Resource Centre case are briefly as follows: in 
December 2006 the Commission instituted an investigation after receiving a complaint 
alleging that the three respondents129 were operating a bread cartel in the Western Cape 
(referred to as the ‘the Western Cape’ complaint). Hereafter Premier applied for, and 
was granted, immunity by the Commission in terms of the CLP, and disclosed that the 
respondents were fixing the price of bread in the Western Cape.130 Additionally, 
Premier provided the Commission with information that led to them initiating a second 
complaint, regarding the operation of the bread cartel in other parts of the country 
(referred to as ‘the National’ complaint).  
The complaint against Tiger Brands and Pioneer Foods was referred to the 
Competition Tribunal. Tiger Brands entered into a settlement agreement with the 
Commission in relation to their unlawful conduct. A penalty of nearly R99 million was 
imposed on Tiger Brands. Pioneer Foods were found guilty of contravening the Act 
and received an administrative penalty of approximately R196 million. The complaint 
against Premier was not referred to the Competition Tribunal as they had been granted 
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immunity by the Commission. Based on the decision of the Tribunal, the applicants131 
instituted class action proceedings in the court a quo against the Respondents.132 
The question that arose before Van Zyl J in the court a quo, was whether the 
applicants had the requisite standing to bring a class action for damages, outside of the 
Constitution, against the Respondents for breaching of the Competition Act by 
participating in cartel conduct. Van Zyl J accepted, without deciding, that the 
applicants had standing to bring such a class action for damages,133 and then proceeded 
to apply the certification requirements as set out in the Law Commission’s Report.134  
It cannot thus be said that the court a quo’s judgment can per se be seen as 
authority for the recognition of a class action for damages in competition law matters, 
as the issue was not decided.  
However the applicants’ leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal (‘SCA’) 
was granted. In the SCA, Wallis J reasoned, relying heftily on the duty imposed on the 
court by s39(2) of the Constitution to develop the common law in line with the ethos 
of the Constitution, and with reference to the apparent absence of a parliamentary 
prescribed procedure applicable to class actions outside of constitutional matters (such 
as the procedure suggested by the Law Commission in their Report135, the judicial 
commission of enquiry,136 as well as Academics.137),138 that in his judgment it would 
be:  
‘…irrational for the court to sanction a class action in cases where a constitutional right 
is invoked,139 but to deny it in equally appropriate circumstances, merely because of the 
claimants’ inability to point to the infringement of a right protected under the Bill of 
Rights. The procedural requirements that will be determined in relation to the one type 
of case can equally easily be applied in the other. Class actions are a particularly 
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appropriate way in which to vindicate some types of constitutional rights, but they are 
equally useful in the context of mass personal injury cases or consumer litigation. I 
accordingly reject the suggestion advanced in some of the academic writing, and in 
some of the heads of argument, that we should await legislative action before 
determining the requirements for instituting a class action in our law. The legislature 
will be free to make its own determination when it turns its attention to this matter and 
in doing so it may adopt an approach different from ours. In the meantime the courts 
must prescribe appropriate procedures to enable litigants to pursue claims by this 
means.’140 
Wallis J does enter one caveat, namely that the court is only concerned with 
determining the broad procedural requirements which form the parameters within 
which a class action outside of the Constitution may be brought. The court is not 
prepared to make policy choices that: 
‘…may impinge upon or even remove, existing rights. That would be to trespass on the 
domain of the legislature, which the doctrine of the separation of powers...does not 
permit us to do.’141 
The SCA was therefore prepared, largely on the basis of the court’s interpretation 
of s39(2) of the Constitution, to extend the scope of class actions beyond the realm of 
constitutional matters, via the recognition of a common law class action for damages. 
Furthermore, the SCA prescribed the same procedure for the institution of class actions 
as recommended by the Law Commission in their Report.142  
As shall become apparent in the following subparagraphs, I find the extension 
of the scope of a class action for damages beyond constitutional matters both 
undesirable, and unwarranted. 
(d) The Problem of Inconsistency and Lack of Uniformity 
By introducing a class action outside of the Constitution in the manner chosen by the 
SCA, the court has perpetuated the trend of inconsistency in the approach to class 
actions, by using an incompatible interpretation and application of the judgments 
handed down by Froneman J in the court a quo143 and Cameron JA in the Supreme 
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Court of Appeal in Ngxuza, to effectively manufacture support for the court’s 
interpretation of s39(2) of the Constitution.  
The Ngxuza judgment provides obvious authority for the view that a Superior 
court may allow144 a class action to be invoked by a party to enforce a constitutional 
right, in spite of the absence of legislation or court rules governing the process. But in 
my opinion it does not provide support for the recognition of a class action in 
competition law matters.145 The judgment does however inform the manner in which 
such a class action should be developed. 
The court approves of the adoption (at least in material respects) of the 
‘American-style class action’ procedure, concluding that section 38(c) of the 
Constitution authorised the use of an ‘American-style class action’ procedure in 
circumstances where constitutional rights are infringed or threatened.146  
Furthermore, the court asserts that (largely) the same requirements for a class 
action as that of Rule 23(a) of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable. 
The court in Ngxuza thus recognised the need, when introducing a class action, to 
prescribe a procedural framework for the invocation of such an action. However the 
adoption of a statutorily based, or court rule based, procedural framework is in my 
opinion preferable to the ad hoc common law procedure which was followed by the 
court.147  
Following a statutory approach to the provision for a class action procedure 
outside of the Constitution is therefore in line with both the Law Commission’s 
recommendation that the development of a class action outside of constitutional 
matters should not be left to the courts, but rather to the legislature,148 and the judgment 
of the court in Ngxuza.  
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, following a statutory approach to 
the provision for a class action procedure outside of the Constitution is, by the court’s 
own admission, necessary. The court states that international literature has alluded to 
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the fact that determining the structure regulating class action procedures, and its 
consequences, gives rise to difficult policy issues (the resolution of which ‘involves 
difficult policy choices that have received differing answers in different 
jurisdictions.’)149The court concludes that, in order to avoid ‘trespass[ing] upon the 
domain of the legislature, which the doctrine of the separation of powers – fundamental 
to our constitutional order – does not permit us to do’,150 a statutory approach to the 
provision for a class action procedure outside of the Constitution is necessary. 
The decision of the court in Children’s Resource Centre to introduce a common 
law class action outside of constitutional matters seems to stem from a notion that there 
existed an obligation stemming from s39(2) of the Constitution, read with s 173 of the 
Constitution, for such an introduction to be conducted by the court, and is a departure 
from the earlier submissions made by the court. 
 Furthermore, the court seems to suggest that judgment in Ngxuza provides 
rational and authoritative support for the notion held by the court in Children’s 
Resource Centre that they were obliged by s39(2) of the Constitution to introduce a 
class action outside of constitutional matters.151 This is incorrect. In my opinion the 
court in Children’s Resource Centre misinterpreted, and extended the application of 
the judgment in Ngxuza beyond its inherent limit (i.e. beyond matters involving 
constitutional issues), and in doing so, lent unwarranted justification to the court’s 
decision to extend the scope of class actions in terms of s 39(1).  
Evidence of  this misinterpretation, and extension of the application of the 
judgments in Ngxuza can be found in Van Zyl AJ’s  reasons in terms of rule 49(1)(c), 
which provides the rationale of his decision in the court a quo, in Trustees for the Time 
Being. Van Zyl AJ, after pointing out the absence of parliamentary prescribed 
procedures (as suggested by the Law Commission in their Report)152 applicable to 
class actions outside of constitutional matters,153 refers to the case of Ngxuza. 
More specifically Van Zyl AJ refers to judgment of Froneman J. Van Zyl AJ 
refers authoritatively to Froneman J’s view that there is no rational reason for 
interpreting s38 narrowly, especially in light of the narrow approach to standing under 
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the common law;154 as well as to Froneman J’s statement, with reference to Maluleke 
v MEC, Health and Welfare, Northern Province155 that the so-called classification 
difficulty and floodgates argument that may arise in class actions; ‘…cannot justify 
the denial of such action when the Constitution makes specific provision for it.’156 
Thereafter Van Zyl AJ claims that: 
‘Although it was stressed in Permanent Secretary Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 
v Nqxuza [supra) that the only issue before that court was the issue of standing in terms 
of section 38(c) (at 1191E), the remarks referred to hereinabove indicate that a general 
class action, not limited to Bill of Rights cases should be available in our law.’157 (Own 
emphasis) 
Wallis J takes the idea that the judgment in Ngxuza provides support to the notion 
of the court that it is obliged to develop the common law class action further, in the 
court of appeal. Wallis J makes reference to the absence of a parliamentary prescribed 
procedure applicable to class actions outside of constitutional matters,158 as suggested 
by the Law Commission in their Report159, the judicial commission of enquiry,160 as 
well as Academics.161 Against this background, and in further support of the decision 
of the court a quo, Wallis states that: 
‘We are thus confronted with a situation where the class action is given express 
constitutional recognition, but nothing has been done to regulate it. The courts must 
therefore address the issue in the exercise of their inherent power to protect and regulate 
their own process and to develop the common law in the interests of justice.162 This may 
on some occasions involve us, and courts that will follow the guidance we give, in 
having to devise ad hoc solutions to procedural complexities on a case by case basis – 
a possibility referred to by the Supreme Court of Canada163  – but the failure to pass 
appropriate legislation dealing with this topic leaves us little alternative in the face of 
the constitutional endorsement of class actions.’164 (Own emphasis) 
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Furthermore, Wallis J states that in his judgment it would be:  
‘…irrational for the court to sanction a class action in cases where a constitutional right 
is invoked,165 but to deny it in equally appropriate circumstances, merely because of the 
claimants’ inability to point to the infringement of a right protected under the Bill of 
Rights. The procedural requirements that will be determined in relation to the one type 
of case can equally easily be applied in the other.’166 
The reasoning of the court in their acceptance of the fact that the applicants had 
standing to bring a class action is thus clearly based on the misapprehension that s39(2) 
of the Constitution obliged the court to develop the common law in this instance, 
despite this being an instance devoid of constitutional rights. Similarly, the idea that 
that the judgments of Froneman J and Cameron AJ can lend support to this 
interpretation of the applicability of s39(2) of the Constitution in casu, is misguided. 
 Hurter states clearly the ‘judgement of the Supreme Court of Appeal cannot be 
read outside of the context of that of the court a quo.’167 Therefore, the judgment of 
Cameron JA regarding the appropriateness of the mechanism of class action in the 
enforcement of constitutional rights (which is the context established by the court a 
quo) cannot, as the court in Pioneer Food proposes, be extended in support of the 
enforcement of non-constitutional rights. Similarly, the judgment of Froneman J in the 
court a quo cannot be read outside of the same context. 
Consequently I am of the opinion that the decision of the court in Pioneer Food 
to extend the scope of class actions beyond constitutional matters was incorrect, and 
the notion of the court that s39(2) of the Constitution obliged them to do so was ill-
founded. Furthermore, the judgments of Froneman J and Cameron AJ do not lend 
support to the purported existence of an obligation in terms of the Constitution to 
develop the common law regarding class actions, other than in matters relating to 
constitutional rights.  
This reinforces the recommendation of the Law Commission that given the 
propensity of the courts to follow an approach to class actions which lacks uniformity 
and consistency, the development of a class action outside of constitutional matters 
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should not have been left to the courts, but that legislation is necessary to broaden the 
scope of class actions outside of constitutional matters. 168  
(e) Conclusion 
As is evident from the American experience, the recognition of a class action for 
damages outside of the scope of constitutional matters is necessary for the private 
enforcement of the Act to be viable. If private individuals could not aggregate their 
claims for damages into class actions, such claims would arguably never be justiciable, 
and private enforcement of the Act would not be possible. Therefore, in this context, 
the decision of the SCA to recognise the existence of a common law class action for 
damages outside of the scope of constitutional matters is a welcome one.  
The private enforcement of the Act can, and must, play a major role in the 
effective and efficient functioning of the CLP (by inducing parties to apply for 
leniency in order to escape civil liability), if the enforcement of the Act is to be 
effective and efficient enforcement. I use the word ‘can’, because in order for the 
private enforcement to induce cartel members to apply for leniency, the possibility of 
instituting private claims for damages against successful applicants must be excluded, 
which is currently not the case. 
Furthermore, the procedure for certification prescribed by the court in the 
Children’s Resource Centre case, is almost identical to that prescribed by Rule 23, and 
the requirements for a class action are identical to those set out in the Law 
Commission’s Report169 (which largely mirror Rule 23’s requirements). As discussed 
in the previous chapter, the certification requirements, in the context of damages 
claims for cartel conduct as prescribed by Rule 23, have become less certain, and more 
frequently and fiercely contested in recent years. Furthermore, the recent judgment of 
the Constitutional Court in the case of Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd and 
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Others170 has provided further scope for such certifications to be challenged in the 
South African context. 
The court in Mukaddam stated that in order to give effect to a litigant’s right of 
access to courts, the rules of court provide litigants with procedural rights, and create 
certainty as to the procedure which must be followed in order to attain the relief 
sought.171 However, as in the case of the requirements regarding the certification of 
class actions for damages outside of constitutional matters, it is the court who must 
determine the procedure to be followed, in line with s173 of the Constitution. In this 
regard the court states that the guiding principle which underlines the section, namely 
‘the interests of justice,’ must be the standard for certification of class actions,172 and 
the requirements laid down by the court in Children’s Resource Centre must serve 
only as ‘factors to be taken into account in determining where the interests of justice 
lie in a particular case.’173  
Given these recent developments, I do not think it is farfetched to think that 
attempts to certify class actions for damages caused by cartel conduct in South Africa 
will suffer similar challenges to those experienced by America.  
 Therefore, unless the class action procedure, including the requirements for 
certification, are clarified in legislation, or the Court Rules, the successful 
classification of a class action for damages cannot be predicted with any certainty by 
applicants, and their invocation may therefore be discouraged. 
 The CLP 
(a) Introduction 
Prior to the introduction of the CLP, which came into force on 6 February 2004 upon 
publication in the Government Gazette174, few investigations and prosecutions of 
cartels occurred under the Act.175 The reason for this is two-fold: 
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(1) The focus of the Commission ‘for the past five years [had] been the evaluation 
of mergers and acquisitions as well as enhancing public awareness of the Act 
and its implications’176 rather than the detection, investigation, and 
prosecution of cartels.  
(2) The secretive nature of cartels makes them inherently difficult to detect, 
investigate, and prosecute. 
However in 2003 the Commissioner of the Commission announced a shift of 
focus. In their annual report, that Commission stated that as part of a shift in focus, 
more attention and resources were to be dedicated to the prosecution of cartels.177   
Accordingly, the Commission developed, in line with the trend in other 
jurisdictions,178 the CLP.179 The CLP is a tool, assisting the Commission in prosecuting 
cartels,180 by encouraging cartel members to provide the Commission with 
information, in exchange for immunity from prosecution181  and fines,182 provided that 
the conditions and requirements of the CLP are met.183  
Initially the CLP did not receive the response anticipated by the Commission. 
The Commission therefore published a discussion paper in 2007 in which areas of the 
CLP that were thought to be problematic, were reviewed. The responses to the 
discussion paper lead the Commission to amend the CLP, and the revised CLP was 
published in the in the government gazette on 23 May 2008.184 The revised CLP now 
forms the focal point of the Commission’s approach to combating cartel conduct in 
significant sectors of the economy,185 and has led to a huge increase in the number of 
cartels investigated, as well as the number of cartel case settlements.186 
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(b) Structure and concepts of the CLP 
The CLP does not possess the force of law; it is a policy document issued by the 
Commission, and is only applicable in respect of alleged cartels.187 The policy sets out 
the ‘benefits, procedure and requirements for co-operation with the Commission in 
exchange for immunity’188 in an effort to induce cartel members to apply to the 
Commission for leniency.  
Although it does not possess the force of law, the revised CLP has succeeded in 
establishing a transparent and predictable process, chiefly by removing the discretion 
of the Commission regarding the granting of immunity to applicants.189 The effect 
hereof is that, provided the conditions and requirements of the CLP190 are fulfilled, the 
Commission must grant the self-confessed cartel member immunity for their 
participation in cartel activity. The CLP therefore may not have the force of law, but 
compliance with its provisions is obligatory, rather than discretionary, and is therefore 
of similar effect. 
The CLP is structured in such a way, that its conditions can be said to form four 
‘guiding principles’.191 These guiding principles will now be analyzed in detail. 
(i) First principle: ‘First to the door’  
The CLP states that only the firm192 that is ‘first to the door’ will be granted 
immunity.193 This principle is crucial to the functioning of the entire CLP. By granting 
immunity to only one firm, an extremely strong incentive for members to cease their 
participation in the cartel and seek immunity is created. A number of competition 
authorities in foreign jurisdictions, including the American completion authorities, 
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recognise this principle as an integral part of the functioning of their immunity 
provisions.194 
However, the ‘first to the door’ principle does not prevent other members from 
coming forward to confess their involvement in the cartel. The CLP alludes to the fact 
that the Commission may enter into other undertakings outside of the CLP, which may 
result in the reduction of a fine, a settlement agreement or a consent order in respect 
of cartel members who confess, but are not ‘first to the door’. The CLP does not 
provide for partial immunity (as is the trend in the European Union)195 for such 
applicants. Instead the Commission may, on an ad hoc basis, grant an applicant a 
reduced fine (pending confirmation by the Tribunal), outside of the CLP. 
The principle of only awarding immunity to the cartel member that is first to 
successfully apply for immunity in terms of the CLP, creates the opportunity to strike 
a necessary balance between attaining the cooperation crucial to the detection, 
investigation, and prosecution of cartels, and ensuring that the cartel members are 
sufficiently sanctioned for their breaches of the Act.  
In my opinion this balance is only achievable, or at least best achieved, by strict 
adherence to the ‘first to the door approach.’ Providing the Commission with the 
authority to enter into agreements with applicants who are not first to the door as to a 
reduced fine, outside of the CLP, allows for a measure of flexibility in the approach 
the Commission chooses to follow after cartel conduct has been detected.  
By introducing flexibility, the transparency and predictability of the process is 
sacrificed. Given the importance of these two concepts to the effectiveness of the CLP, 
such a sacrifice is not justified. The introduction of partial immunity, as well as the use 
of reduced fines should be avoided. They dilute the effectiveness of this principle, by 
reducing the incentive of members to be the first to apply to the Commission, as well 
as the severity of the sanctions.196 
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Furthermore, the introduction of the common law class action has introduced the 
risk of civil liability, even in cases where parties have successfully been the ‘first to 
the door’, and have been granted immunity in terms of the CLP.197 This not only dilutes 
the incentive to be ‘first to the door’ but also affects the transparency and predictability 
of the process, and is unacceptable, for the same reasons mentioned above. 
(ii) Second principle: Admission of contravention of Act 
The admission requirement for the granting of immunity to an applicant in the CLP 
seems to require that the applicant must confess to his participation, or suspected 
participation in the cartel activity.198 But whether the applicant has to confess simply 
to his participation, or to an actual contravention of s4(1)(b) of the Act is uncertain.  
Certain academics are of the opinion that it is implicit that immunity in terms of 
the CLP will be granted only to those who confess to a contravention of the Act. 199  
Their argument is that if the applicant does not admit to a contravention of the Act, 
then the purpose of granting immunity, namely to facilitate the investigation and 
prosecution of the other cartel members, would be defeated. A number of foreign 
jurisdictions share this view.200 I do not share this view for the following reasons:  
(1) Until such time as the alleged cartel members are found guilty of a 
contravention of the Act by the Competition Tribunal and/or the Competition 
Appeal Court, no contravention of s4(1)(b) of the Act has occurred. 
Accordingly, at the stage when a firm needs to make such a ‘confession’ they 
can only confess to having participated in conduct which may, but may not, 
amount to a contravention of s4(1)(b) of the Act.  
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(2) The purpose of granting leniency is in no way defeated if an applicant only 
confesses to their participation in the activities of the alleged cartel. The 
purpose is still fulfilled, so long as the applicant fully cooperates with the 
Commission, and I fail to see how the extent of the applicant’s confession 
affects this. The granting of conditional immunity will only be made upon the 
satisfaction of all the requirements of the CLP, which provide sufficient 
protection against any abuse of the CLP process.  
(3) Such an admission of guilt could form a cause of action, or at least a prima 
facie cause of action, based on which a common law class action could be 
instituted. This cannot be so, for it alludes to the possibility of instituting a class 
action for damages, caused by cartel conduct, against a party who has not been 
found guilty of a cartel conduct in terms the Act, and may never be found to be 
in contravention thereof. 
Thus given the anomalies to which the above approach leads, as well as the 
cumulative nature of the requirements of the CLP, there is no need to follow such a 
stringent interpretation of this requirement.  I therefore submit that, for the proper 
functioning of the CLP, the admission principle’s requirement need only be interpreted 
as requiring the applicant to admit to his participation in the alleged cartel conduct. 
(iii) Third principle: Cartel activity covered by leniency 
The CLP is applicable in respect of any alleged cartel conduct, which usually 
materialises in the form of a s4(1)(b) per se prohibition. 201 However, an application 
for leniency appears to be subject to certain time restrictions. The CLP provides that 
an application for leniency can occur either:202 
(1) Before the Commission is aware of the cartel activity; 
(2) After the Commission become aware of the cartel activity, but they have 
too little information, and have not instituted an investigation; or 
(3) While the Commission’s investigation is pending, or instituted, but the 
Commission is of the opinion that they do not have sufficient evidence to 
prosecute the members of the alleged cartel. 
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This approach is in line with the observations made by Hammond with regards 
to the Second pillar. By allowing applications for leniency to occur at any time, the 
perceived threat of detection is maintained at all times.  
Furthermore, the CLP does not expressly distinguish between leniency 
applications (as America does)203 based on whether they were submitted prior to the 
Commission launching an investigation or at a later stage. So long as the application 
made fits into one of the three abovementioned scenarios, the treatment of the 
applicant, and the application, theoretically remains the same. By treating all 
applications for leniency the same, the transparency and predictability of the process, 
as well as the perceived threat of detection, is maintained throughout. 
In practice the three scenarios do act as a funnelling instrument though, 
narrowing the gap into which an application must fit. The further into the process of 
detection, investigation and prosecution the application takes place, the more 
circumspection the Commission will employ, and the more valuable the contribution 
of the applicant needs to be, if their application for immunity is to be successful. This 
prevents against abuse of the CLP.  
(iv) Fourth principle: Immunity 
There are three forms of immunity (Conditional, Total, and No immunity) awarded in 
terms of the CLP. ‘Conditional Immunity’204 is granted to an applicant at the initial 
stage of the application, by the Commission. Conditional Immunity can be revoked at 
any time by the Commission, but only if ‘at any stage, the applicant does not co-operate 
or fails to fulfil any other condition or requirement set out in the CLP.’205  Therefore 
the Commission does not have discretion to revoke ‘Conditional Immunity’, only to 
decline to revoke it.  
Immunity remains conditional until such time as the Competition Tribunal or the 
Competition Appeal Court has made a final decision in respect of the alleged cartel.206 
Thereafter, ‘the applicant for immunity under the CLP will qualify for [Total] 
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immunity provided it meets the following conditions and requirements [of the 
CLP].’207 (Own emphasis) 
 It is therefore clear that if the requirements and conditions under the CLP are 
met, the Commission must grant the applicant Total Immunity. 208No equitable 
discretion is afforded to the Commission, Tribunal or Appeal Court in such an 
instance. However, if the applicant fails to meet the requirements and conditions for 
immunity under the CLP, ‘No Immunity’ will be granted.209 
Once Total Immunity is granted, it cannot be revoked. However, the boundaries 
of the protection offered by Total Immunity to a successful CLP applicant are not 
without limits. Currently, Total Immunity will not protect the successful applicant 
from civil liability210 for damages resulting from their participation in the cartel 
conduct which breaches the provisions of the Act 211 (Such a claim for damages is a 
follow-on claim). Furthermore, the damage suffered as a result of a prohibited practice 
is classified as pure economic loss. 212 
The importance of this classification becomes evident when determining 
whether a valid delictual claim for damages exists. For a valid delictual claim for 
damages to exist, far more is required than the claimant simply stating that they have 
suffered a loss as a result of the conduct of another. The claimant must prove, on a 
balance of probabilities, that all of the elements of the delict in question are present. 
And in the case of a claim for pure economic loss, it is required that the claimant 
seeking to claim damages for pure economic loss establishes that the person who 
caused the harm suffered, was under a legal duty not to cause such harm towards him, 
and therefore that their failure to do so is ‘wrongful in accordance with the legal 
convictions of the community’.213  
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The wrongfulness enquiry is extremely complex when dealing with delictual 
damages for pure economic loss.214 This is due to the fact that there is no presumption 
of wrongfulness. Further considerations of public and legal policy dictate whether a 
party should be held legally liable for the loss resulting from the cartel conduct.215 The 
causing of pure economic loss will only be wrongful where a legal duty to prevent 
such a loss occurring is proven to have been imposed on the party who caused the loss.  
The SCA in Children’s Resource Centre makes it clear that for purposes of a 
damages claim in terms of the Act, the prohibition of cartel conduct alone, does not 
establish a legal duty not to cause pure economic loss: 
‘It would be a startling departure from principles that have been recognised as 
compatible with our new constitutional order, for liability to compensate for loss or 
damage flowing from a prohibited practice to exist in the absence of any duty to prevent 
such loss. It would eliminate one of the basic principles by which our law prevents 
liability for acts causing damage from being extended beyond acceptable limits.’216 
O’Reagan, with reference to case law, concludes that there are two possible 
sources of such a duty not to prevent economic loss in the context of the breach of a 
statutory obligation: 
‘An express statutory provision providing for damages will put the matter beyond doubt, 
but where there is no express provision of this sort, the question is not one of statutory 
interpretation alone. As the Supreme Court of Appeal stated in Olitzki; 217 ‘it depends 
less on the application of formulaic approaches to statutory construction than on a broad 
assessment by the Court whether it is just and reasonable that a civil claim for damages 
should be accorded.’’218 
In my opinion Section 65 of the Act imposes an express statutory duty not to 
cause economic loss to another. Section 65 prescribes that a person who has suffered 
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loss or damage as the result of a prohibited practice may claim damages arising from 
such prohibited practice, subject to the following requirements: 
(1) In terms of s65(9) of the Act, only once a guilty finding has been made 
against a successful CLP applicant could the right to institute a  claim for 
damages, due to cartel conduct, possibly arise.  
(2) In terms of s65(6)(a) of the Act, the claimant must not have been awarded 
damages in a consent order confirmed in terms of s 49D(1) of the Act.  
(3) In terms of s65(6)(b) of the Act, the claimant must have filed with the 
Registrar or Clerk of the Court a notice from the Chairperson of the 
Competition Tribunal, or the Judge President of the Competition Appeal 
Court. This notice must inter alia certify: 
‘(i) ...that the conduct constituting the basis for the action has been found to 
be a prohibited practice in terms of this Act;... 
(iii) setting out the section of this Act in terms of which the Tribunal or the 
Competition Appeal Court made its finding.’219 
In the case of a class action claim, the notice must be filed at the certification 
stage of proceedings, in order to establish a ‘cause of action raising a triable 
issue’,220 as required by the certification requirements. 
It would thus seem logical that by expressly providing for damages for pure 
economic loss, s65of the Act not only creates a statutory duty not to cause pure 
economic loss via a prohibited practice, but also lays down the requirements for 
satisfying the wrongfulness enquiry when claiming damages for pure economic loss 
suffered as a result of a prohibited practice. 
 Consequently, the institution of a class action claim for damages against an 
applicant who has been granted Total Immunity should not succeed, unless the 
requirements of s65 of the Act have been satisfied, otherwise the claim will fail as a 
result of not fulfilling the wrongfulness requirement.  
 Furthermore, by requiring a cause of action that is sourced in legislation, a 
manner of protection is afforded to applicants who have been granted Total Immunity 
in terms of the CLP. This protection not only promotes the transparency, predictability, 
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and confidence of applicants in the CLP process, but also ensures that only those class 
actions which advance the interests of justice are certified.221  
However, Premier Foods (Proprietary) Ltd v Manoim N.O and Others222 makes 
it clear that an applicant who has been granted Total Immunity should expect that the 
Tribunal will issue a s65(6)(b) notice to claimants for the purpose of commencing 
follow-on damages claims, in spite of the fact that no complaint against them was 
referred to the Tribunal for adjudication (eroding the protection offered by s65 of the 
Act). And what is of even greater concern is that Children’s Resource Centre seems 
to suggest that a s65 notice is not required to institute a civil class action claim for 
damages (removing the protection offered by s65 of the Act completely).  
In Manoim N.O the court held, based on their interpretation of s 27(c) of the Act, 
s58(1)(a)(v) of the Act, and paragraph 3.4 of the CLP, that the Tribunal may issue a 
s65(6)(b) notice to claimants for the purpose of commencing follow-on damages 
claims, in spite of the fact that no complaint against them was referred to the Tribunal 
for adjudication.  Given the American experience, where the likelihood and severity 
of follow-on damages play a vital role in a cartel member’s decision to apply for 
leniency, the decision of the court in Manoim N.O is likely to have a deterrent effect 
on a cartel member’s decision to apply for leniency, and must, in the eyes of the 
Commission, be viewed as a ‘lost opportunity to encourage leniency applicants…’223 
The SCA in Children’s Resource Centre had no apparent objections to a class 
action being instituted against Premier foods in spite of the fact that no s65 notice had 
been filed against Premier by the applicants. Furthermore, no such certificate has been, 
nor can be (in the opinion of the Premier), issued by the Competition Tribunal or 
Competition appeal court in respect of Premier, as the case against Premier has not 
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been referred to the tribunal, and they can therefore not find Premier’s conduct to be a 
prohibited practice in terms of the Act.  
Instead the SCA seems to make the startling departure which they earlier warned 
against. By allowing the appellants claim against Premier to proceed simply because 
the claim was advanced on a ‘potentially plausible basis’224 the SCA seems to have 
ignored the requirements of the Act. Given the express requirements set out in s65 of 
the Act, where no claim has been advanced that prima facie, or at least plausibly 
satisfies the requirements of the Act, it cannot be said that a civil claim for damages 
should proceed. 
 The court skirts around these requirements by using general statements of fact 
and presumptions. The court was of the opinion that given the fact that Premier was 
involved in conduct that has a tendency to artificially inflate the price of bread, the 
consumers would have suffered pure economic loss. In the absence of evidence from 
the respondents, demonstrating the falsity of that line of reasoning, the appellants’ case 
on the facts could not be rejected by the court at that stage, as the appellants had shown 
that a ‘potentially viable claim for delictual damages vested in a class of consumers.’225  
These statements, in my opinion, do not anchor the claimants’ claim within the 
requirements of section 65, and therefore the claim for delictual damages should have 
been dismissed on the facts. 
 The qualification to the granting of Total Immunity, which allows for the 
institution of claims for civil damages for pure economic loss, provided the elements 
of a delict can be proven, thus has far-reaching consequences for the effective 
operation of the CLP. This is particularly so in light of the decisions of the courts in 
Children’s Resource Centre, and Manoim N.O, which have created an element of 
uncertainty as to the requirement of wrongfulness for the institution of civil class 
action for damages in situations where Total Immunity has been granted. The 
uncertainty surrounding this requirement, translates into uncertainty in the 
requirements for certification, and therefore clouds the perceived transparency and 
predictability of the process. 
Furthermore, the qualification and uncertainty, when viewed in conjunction with 
the admission requirement in the ‘Second Principle’, conceivably ‘opens the door’ for 
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the institution of a common law class action claim for damages not only against a 
member found guilty of cartel conduct by the Tribunal, but also against a member who 
has been granted Total Immunity from prosecution, even in spite of the want for a 
source for legal duty.  
The result of allowing civil sanctions to be imposed on firms that have been 
granted immunity is that a strong disincentive to apply for leniency is created. This 
disincentive will grow stronger if, as in the American experience, the number of class 
actions, as well as the amounts recovered through private actions for damages, 
increases, and the Total Immunity provided by the CLP does not provide successful 
applicants with complete reprieve from prosecution and monetary sanctions. 
(c) Extent and success of the use of the CLP 
The introduction of the CLP in 2004 did not have the success in the fight against cartel 
conduct that the competition authorities had initially hoped for. In fact the Commission 
only received fourteen CLP applications in its first three years of operation. This 
prompted a review of the CLP. 226 In reviewing the CLP the Commission drew from 
the feedback of stakeholders, as well as their own research into the international best 
practice in fighting cartel conduct.227In particular the Commission identified six points 
of concern that needed to be addressed:228 
(1) The CLP was not provided for in the Act or in the Rules for the Conduct of 
Proceedings in the Commission. It was therefore uncertain as to what the 
legal nature, and binding force of the CLP was. It was suggested that the 
Act be amended to specifically make provision for the CLP. 
(2) The wording of the CLP conceivably afforded the Commission an 
unfettered discretion in deciding whether or not they would grant an 
applicant immunity, despite their compliance with the conditions and 
requirements of the CLP. It was submitted that such discretion should not 
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be afforded, and that any uncertainty in this regard be removed through 
amendment to the CLP. 
(3) Applicants were required to make written applications. It was proposed that 
oral or paperless submissions be permitted to alleviate applicants’ fear that 
their submissions might be used against them in civil litigation. 
(4) Firms who instigated or coerced firms to join (or remain in) the cartel were 
excluded from being granted immunity. It was recommended that this 
qualification be removed in order to increase anxiety and distrust among 
cartel members. 
(5) The CLP did not make provision for ‘markers’ to reserve an applicant’s 
place whilst they compiled necessary information. It was recommended that 
the CLP be amended to provide for this. 
(6) It was unclear to whom applicants should apply for leniency. It is 
recommended that the Enforcement & Exemptions manager be contacted. 
The revised CLP was subsequently published in the Government Gazette on 23 May 
2008. The revised CLP addresses all the concerns with the previous CLP raised in the 2007 
discussion paper, except those regarding the first point mentioned above. Therefore the CLP 
still does not enjoy the force of law. However, through consistent adherence to, and 
application of, the CLP the Commission seems to have settled any uncertainty created in the 
minds of applicants by its lack of force of law.229  
Since the abovementioned reforms, the CLP has enjoyed far greater success. The 
reforms to the CLP have dramatically increased the risk (both perceived and actual) of cartel 
conduct being detected, and the fear amongst members of not being ‘first to the door’. 230  
This destabilisation within cartels has led to an exponential increase (albeit a fluctuating one) 
in the number of leniency applications received by the Commission since the review. The 
Commission has received in excess of thirteen times the number of applications received 
prior to the revision.231  
Another contributing factor to the success of the CLP has been the shift in attitude 
shown by the Commission towards the prosecution of cartel conduct, and the punishment of 
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the participants thereto. The recent introduction of the Cartels Division,232 increased number 
of cartel conduct prosecutions, as well as severely higher administrative penalties, has 
rendered any level of tolerance that may once have existed for firms found guilty of cartel 
conduct in terms of the Act, a thing of the past.233  
The increasingly large administrative fines being handed out by the Commission to 
offenders, have not only shown that the Commission is willing to hit with a bigger ‘stick’, 
but have also provided the Commission with a juicier looking ‘carrot’ (namely the Total 
Immunity afforded by the CLP) to attract the cooperation of cartel members. 
The CLP is a tool which functions on the basis of mutual benefit. On the one hand, it 
provides firms with the opportunity, no matter how deeply involved they are in the cartel’s 
conduct, to attain immunity and escape these increasingly large administrative fines. On the 
other, it gives the Commission the ability to detect, investigate, and prosecute cartels that 
would in all likelihood have gone undetected and therefore unpunished.  
However, the introduction of the common law class action for damages threatens the 
balance between the maintenance of sufficiently severe and effective sanctioning in 
appropriate circumstances, and the provision of immunity to such sanctioning for cartel 
members ‘first to the door’. The CLP relies on this balance for its proper functioning. 
Therefore the efficient enforcement of the Act against cartel conduct is largely reliant on the 
maintenance of this balance. The possibility of class action claims for damages against a firm 
granted immunity in terms of the CLP, as discussed above, threatens to upset this balance.  
Consequently, it is submitted that the possibility of initiating private class actions for 
damages against firms granted immunity in terms of the CLP, must be excluded by way of a 
statutory amendment to the Act. 
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 Effect of the Operation of Common Law Class Action on the 
effective Operation of the Competition Commission’s ‘Corporate 
Leniency Policy’ 
(a)  Introduction 
As submitted above, the protection afforded by the immunity provisions of the CLP, 
in its current form, does not extend to protection from civil claims.234 As a result, the 
introduction of the common law class action (albeit unintentionally) has resulted in the 
erosion of the three pillars identified by Hammond as forming the foundation for an 
effective CLP, and therefore has reduced the effectiveness of the CLP. Given the 
importance of the effective and efficient functioning of the CLP in the enforcement of 
the Act, this is not a tolerable result, and corrective action is necessary. By excluding 
the possibility of instituting private action for damages against a party granted Total 
Immunity in terms of the CLP, I believe that the introduction of a class action for 
damages can have a hugely positive effect on the enforcement of the Act against 
cartels.  
As submitted earlier, Hammond identified three pillars that must first be in place 
before any jurisdiction’s CLP can be enforced efficiently, and consequently, before 
any jurisdiction’s antitrust law can be enforced effectively. As a brief reminder, 
Hammond’s three pillars are: 235 
(1) The CLP must be transparent and predictable, so that cartel members can 
accurately predict how they will be treated if they choose to self-report, 
or fail to do so.  
(2) Cartel members must perceive the threat of detection to be high, if they 
do not self-report.  
(3) The antitrust law must provide severe sanctions for cartel members who 
do not self-report, and complete reprieve from such sanctions for those 
who are first to self-report. 
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In this chapter I will examine the effect that the introduction of the common law 
class action has had on these pillars, and therefore, the ability of the CLP to operate 
effectively. To aid in this examination, I will make use of a hypothetical case study, to 
illustrate the practical implications of the introduction of the common law class action, 
on the three pillars. The hypothetical case study will illustrate how each of the three 
pillars is affected, by examining how the decision making process of A (Pty) Ltd, a 
small firm with limited involvement in the cartel conduct in question, is affected by 
the introduction of the common law class action. 
 A (Pty) Ltd, B (Pty) Ltd, and C (Pty) Ltd are the sole producers of the 21 billion 
cigarettes consumed by South Africans annually. Each firm produces its own 
cigarettes, but they are packaged at, and distributed to the public by, a central facility 
(D (Pty) Ltd).  
In 2012 B and C initiated cartel conduct, and coerced A to enter into agreement 
with them in terms of which they agreed to increase the price at which they sold 
cigarettes to D on a particular date. The production values are as follows:  
 A(Pty) Ltd B(Pty) Ltd C(Pty) Ltd 
Units produced 1 000 000 000 10 000 000 000 10 000 000 000 
Competitive turnover R 10 000 000 R 100 000 000 R 100 000 000 
Collusive turnover R 20 000 000 R 200 000 000 R 200 000 000 
Maximum monetary sanction prior to the introduction of the common law class action 
If NOT granted Total Immunity: 
(Maximum Administrative fine) 
R 200 000 R 20 000 000 R 20 000 000 
If GRANTED Total Immunity: 
(Maximum Administrative fine) 
R 0 R 0 R 0 
Maximum monetary sanction after the introduction of the common law class action 
 If NOT granted Total Immunity: 
(Maximum Administrative fine + Private 
damages ) 
R 200 000 + x R 20 000 000 + x R 20 000 000 + x 
If GRANTED Total Immunity: 
(Maximum Administrative fine + Private 
damages ) 





(b) Prior to the introduction of the common law class action 
Prior to the introduction of the common law class action there has only been a single 
case where a private claim for damages was pursued for a breach of the Act.236 The 
effective operation of a CLP, as stated above, is largely dependent on the three pillars 
identified by Hammond. The effect of a lack of an effective means of instituting private 
action on these three pillars, as well as on the decision making process of a potential 
leniency applicant to apply for leniency or not, will now be examined.  
(i) Transparency and predictability 
Since the revised CLP was introduced in 2008, and prior to the introduction of the 
common law class action, the transparency and predictability of treatment of the 
program has increased dramatically. This has been achieved principally by making the 
granting of immunity automatic upon compliance with the requirements of the CLP.237 
This, in combination with the absence of any threat of potentially facing (large) private 
actions for damages, has resulted in the number of leniency applications increasingly 
dramatically.238 
Therefore, the trends experienced in the South African jurisdiction, as well as in 
the American jurisdiction, indicate that by enabling a cartel member to accurately 
predict how they will be treated, not only if they apply for leniency, but if they fail to 
do so, provides a strong driver to the cartel members to apply for leniency.  
Importantly, due to the fact that private actions for damages essentially played 
no role in the enforcement of the Act at this time, the failure of the CLP or the Act to 
exclude the possibility of instituting a private action for damages had no effect on A’s 
perception of the transparency and predictability of the program, and therefore his 
decision to apply for leniency.  
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(ii) Perception of detection 
According to Hammond, in order for a CLP to effectively destabilise a cartel, the threat 
of detection must be perceived to be imminent. Therefore A must perceive that the 
cartel activity in question will be detected by the authorities at any moment. 
The transparency and predictability of the CLP process, as well as the sanctions 
imposed by authorities for cartel conduct, inform this element to a large degree in the 
South African context. Unlike the American jurisdiction, who make use of various 
other investigative tools,239 the South African authorities are almost entirely dependent 
on the perceived threat of detection created by the CLP itself, in order to induce cartel 
members to self-report.  
The CLP achieves this perception of detection by maintaining a perceived level 
of transparency and predictability, and imposing large sanctions on those who fail to 
report. The combination of the pillars increases the perceived risk that other members 
will apply for leniency first, and therefore creates a perception of detection.  
The success of this pillar as a driver for leniency applications is reflected by the 
number of applications for leniency received by the Commission in recent years. 240 
Firm A, given its perception that the level of detection is high (due to chiefly to the 
perceived risk of another cartel member applying for leniency first.), would be more 
easily induced into applying for leniency, for two reasons:  
(1) A’s lower level of participation in the cartel means that A gains less from the 
cartel conduct, and therefore has less to lose by applying for leniency.  
(2) Without the presence of the threat of civil sanctioning, A can predict with 
certainty that if he applies for leniency, he is guaranteed of being granted 
Total Immunity (provided that he complies with the conditions and 
requirements of the CLP)241 and that he will not face any sanctioning. 
Therefore, as with the previous pillar, due to the fact that private actions for 
damages essentially played no role in the enforcement of the Act at this time, the 
failure of the CLP or the Act to exclude the possibility of instituting a private action 
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for damages had no effect on firm A’s perception of detection, and therefore their 
decision to apply for leniency.  
(iii) Criminal & Civil Sanctions and the possibility of immunity 
Unlike the American regime, the South African competition law regime does not at 
present provide for criminal sanctions for cartel conduct. Instead, the competition 
authorities rely on the imposition of monetary sanctions to enforce the prohibition in 
the Act, and to act as a deterrent to cartel conduct. 
The Commission stated recently in their working paper, that in order for the CLP 
to be effective, administrative penalties must ‘give force to the prohibition [of cartel 
conduct in the Act] and act as a deterrent, not only against re-offending (specific 
deterrence), but also against other conduct that has not been investigated (general 
deterrence).’242 Furthermore, they must be as closely linked as possible to the amount 
of damage caused by the member in question.243 The Commission’s opinion is thus, 
that effective enforcement of the CLP requires specific and general deterrence, and 
proportional sanctioning.244 I agree. 
However, as illustrated by the American experience, the monetary sanctions, 
alone, that are enforced by authorities for cartel conduct, are insufficient. In America, 
they fail to disgorge a sufficient amount of the profits made by large cartel members 
for it to be said that they, alone, act as an effective deterrent (which is the primary goal 
of sanctions).245 The South African experience has been similar in this regard. 
Although there has been a significant increase in the quantum of administrative 
penalties granted, they simply do not constitute a sufficient proportion of the damage 
caused to constitute an effective deterrent to cartel conduct.246 
Furthermore, there is a statutory limitation in s59 (2) of 10% of the firm’s annual 
turnover. Therefore, there is a limit to the role that administrative fines can play in 
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creating deterrent and proportional sanctions. Without a class action for damages, 
sanctions may be severe, but they do enforce the prohibition of cartel conduct in the 
Act, or act as deterrent. 
In the hypothetical case study, the lack of a class action for damages causes A’s 
incentive to apply for leniency to decrease in a cyclical manner.  
(1) A maximum fine of R200 000 can be imposed on them, which is relatively 
little when compared with their turnover of R20 000 000.  
(2) The other members’ deeper involvement in the cartel conduct, in the 
absence of sufficiently deterrent sanctions (a maximum fine of R20 000 000 
can be imposed on firm B, and C), makes it more likely for them to perceive 
prosecution, and administrative penalties as a cost of doing business, rather 
than a deterrent to participate in the cartel conduct, or an incentive to apply 
for leniency (as their profit from the collusive conduct amounts to 
R200 000 000 each), and they are therefore likely to simply continue such 
conduct.247 In light of thereof, A’s perception of detection is likely to 
decrease, and A is therefore further disincentivised from applying for 
leniency, which further disincentivises B and C to apply for leniency, and 
so on. 
(iv) Conclusion 
All things considered, it is submitted that the destabilisation caused by the CLP, in the 
absence of private enforcement mechanisms, would be sufficient to cause A to apply 
for leniency in terms of the CLP before the other cartel members considered doing so. 
However, if the incentive of the other cartel members to self-report could be increased, 
such self-reporting would be even more likely, and take place much sooner.  
The position outlined above is reflective of Hammond’s three pillars, and gives 
rise to a fair result in the event of A applying for leniency. The party least involved in 
the conduct is immune from prosecution and sanctioning. Both the result and the policy 
itself are subsequently easily justifiable on public policy grounds.248  
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However the position does not wholly reflect the foundation necessary to allow 
the Act to truly be effectively enforced. Primarily this is due to the inadequacy of the 
transparency of the process, and the inadequacy of the deterrent effect of the monetary 
sanctions imposed on cartel members who fail to self-report. 
Consequently, it is evident that there exists a need for reform, and the 
introduction of an effective private enforcement mechanism, to complement the public 
enforcement mechanism, and ensure that the monetary sanctions imposed on cartel 
members who fail to self-report act as deterrents to cartel conduct. 
(c) After the introduction of the common law class action 
The introduction of the common law class action means that A is now faced with a 
further factor to consider, namely the possibility of facing a further monetary sanction, 
namely a private class action for damages (x), despite being granted Total Immunity 
in terms of the CLP. The fourth Guiding Principle of the CLP states that Total 
Immunity will not protect the successful applicant against criminal or civil liability 
which results from their participation in the cartel conduct which breaches the 
provisions of the Act. This is likely to create a number of problems regarding the 
enforcement of the CLP. 
The recentness of the introduction of the common law class action for damages 
in the context of cartel cases, in South African law, means that the full effect of its 
introduction has yet to be experienced. However, it is the opinion of the Commission 
that ‘[s]imilar actions seem likely to feature more prominently in future...’249 This view 
is in line with trend experienced in America following the introduction by the DOJ of 
their revised CLP in 1993.250  
I therefore submit that as the use of such class actions for damages becomes 
more prominent, the problems with the enforcement of the CLP referred to above will 
become more and more prevalent, and have a far reaching, and negative, impact on the 
effectiveness of the CLP as a tool for combating cartel conduct.  
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(i) Transparency and predictability 
The failure to exclude the common law class actions application from operating against 
a successful leniency applicant has resulted in its introduction causing an erosion of 
the transparency and predictability of the process. 
As previously submitted, class action claims for damages, for damage caused by 
cartel conduct, is a follow-on claim, which in terms of the Act, must be preceded by a 
breach of the Act, and compliance with s65 of the Act. However, the SCA in 
Children’s Resource Centre alluded to the fact that in order to prove delictual damages, 
s65 of the Act need not be complied with. The court was content to allow the 
wrongfulness requirement to be satisfied, without the express statutory requirement 
for wrongfulness in this context (set out in s65 of the Act) being satisfied. 
When the fourth Guiding Principle of the CLP, the accompanying relaxed 
approach to the requirements of the wrongfulness enquiry of the SCA, and the second 
Guiding Principle of the CLP (which requires that the applicant must confess to his 
participation, or suspected participation in the cartel activity)251  are read together, two 
important and detrimental consequences arise for a successful leniency applicant, 
which have a negative effect on a cartel member’s decision-making process of whether 
to self-report, and therefore threatens the effective enforcement of the CLP: 
(1) First, it becomes apparent that there exists the very real possibility that an 
applicant who has been granted Total Immunity could be faced with a class 
action claim for damages from large, or even multiple classes.  
(2) Secondly, the ‘confession’ given in their leniency application, alone, could 
satisfy the wrongfulness enquiry. Thus a class action for damages could 
succeed with a transgression of the Act neither occurring, nor being required 
to occur. Such an approach would leave the successful CLP applicant very 
little, if any, scope to defend against a class action for damages, despite the 
claim being based on nothing more than the confession, made by an applicant 
in the process of their application, to partaking in a prohibited practice. 
This position is not satisfactory. Transparency and predictability of the process 
must be maintained if the CLP is to be enforced effectively. Instead the current position 
                                                 
 




has introduced an element of uncertainty as to how a successful leniency applicant will 
be treated, and the monetary sanctions that they will face (R 0 + x), despite being 
granted Total Immunity. Such presence of such uncertainties erodes this pillar. 
(ii) Perception of detection 
As submitted above, the failure to exclude the common law class actions application 
from operating against a successful leniency applicant has resulted in a lack of 
transparency and predictability of the CLP process, as successful applicants now 
potentially face civil damages claims with a monetary value (x) that is unknown to the 
cartel member at the time of deciding whether to apply for leniency or not. One of the 
effects hereof, is that cartel members will most likely be less inclined to apply for 
leniency, and the perception of detection is thus likely to decrease. 
In our hypothetical case study the following would be reflected: all three of the 
firms will be less likely to apply for leniency due to the decreased threat of imminent 
detection, and the increased opportunity cost of applying for leniency for all firms (due 
to the addition of the monetary sanction ‘x’, which firms will be faced with regardless 
of whether they are granted Total Immunity or not). As submitted above, when the 
threat of imminent detection through the self-reporting of other cartel members 
decreases, so too does the perceived threat of detection. A’s incentive to self-report is 
thus exponentially decreased by a combination of two factors: 
(1) The probability that they will face a class action claim for damages.  
(2) A, B and C’s incentive to apply for leniency, and thus their perception of 
an imminent threat of detection, decreases in a cyclical manner.  The deeper 
involvement of firms B and C, as submitted above, results in B and C 
attaining much higher profits from the cartel conduct, and causes A to be 
more likely to self-report. However, it now also means that they are likely 
to face large class action cases for damages, and are therefore even less 
likely to self-report. This in turn decreases A’s perception of detection, 
causing it to be less-likely to self-report. This results in B and C’s 




(iii) Criminal & Civil Sanctions and the possibility of immunity 
As submitted above,252 administrative penalties alone are not sufficient for monetary 
sanctioning to act as an effective manner to enforce the prohibition on cartel conduct 
in the Act, as well as a deterrent to cartel conduct. But, when the imposition of 
administrative penalties is combined with private class actions for damages, as in 
America, monetary sanctions have proven to be effective in both the enforcement of 
antitrust legislation, as well as the deterrence of cartel conduct.253 
Although South Africa has not yet experienced the effect of the class action 
claims and settlements, the American experience is evidence of the effectiveness of 
these actions as a complementary sanction, which in fact enables monetary sanctions 
to perform this role envisaged above, as an effective enforcement mechanism of the 
prohibition in the Act, as well as a successful deterrent to cartel conduct.254  
Therefore, the introduction of the common law class action provides the 
potential for monetary sanctions to effectively enforce the prohibition in the Act, as 
well as deter cartel conduct. By functioning as an extension of the public sanctioning 
of cartel conduct, severely increasing the potential monetary sanctions that a cartel 
member who failed to self-report would face, the threat of facing a civil claim for 
damages increases the size of the ‘stick’ with which the competition authorities can 
fight cartel conduct. 
However, as was noted in Chapter 3, in order to be in a position to use the ‘stick’, 
a ‘carrot’ is needed to enable the competition authorities to effectively detect and 
investigate cartel conduct, which will then put them in a position to use their ‘stick’, 
and sanction cartel members for their participation in such conduct. In America this 
carrot is provided by their CLP, and more specifically, the granting to a successful 
leniency applicant of protection against civil claims for damages.255 But in the South 
African system, no such protection is granted to a successful leniency applicant who 
has been granted Total Immunity in terms of the CLP.256  
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Therefore although the introduction of the common law class action has provided 
the competition authorities with monetary sanctions that are a potentially effective 
method to enforce the provisions of the Act, and deter cartel conduct, the failure to 
exclude the possibility of instituting a private action for damages against a successful 
leniency applicant means that these monetary sanctions act as incentives to refrain 
from applying for leniency, rather than inducing firms to apply for leniency.  
(iv) Conclusion 
The failure to exclude the possibility of instituting a private action for damages against 
a successful leniency applicant has resulted in the introduction of the common law 
class action operating (albeit unintentionally) to reduce the destabilisation effect of the 
CLP on cartels. The CLP relies on destabilising cartel structures in order to function 
as an effective public enforcement tool of the Act. By allowing class actions to be 
instituted against successful applicants, the CLP is no longer able to sufficiently 
destabilise cartels. As was discussed earlier, in order for the private enforcement of the 
Act to supplement the public enforcement of the Act, the Total Immunity granted by 
the Act must provide the successful applicant with protection against private actions 
for damages resulting from the cartel conduct in question. 
By not providing for such protection in the Act, the threat of facing a class action 
for damages acts as a large disincentive to applying for leniency, and consequently the 
CLP is not able to create the level of fear, distrust and confusion necessary to induce 
members to apply for leniency, as the threat of facing a potential class action for 
damages outweighs the benefits of applying for leniency. 
The incentive for firms, particularly those that are not so deeply involved in the 
cartel conduct has therefore begun to lean towards either shying away from the cartel 
conduct they are involved in (but not alerting authorities to such conduct), or simply 
continuing to participate in the cartel conduct as they know that it is in the other cartel 
members’ own interests to do the same. This alignment of incentive among cartel 
members reflects an ineffective CLP, lacking the necessary perceived threat of 
detection and severe sanctions (Hammond’s Second and third pillars of an effective 
CLP). 
Therefore, the introduction of the common law class action results in A’s 




(1) The cost of applying for leniency is not only the loss in turnover which A 
receives from the cartel conduct (R 10 000 000) but also the indeterminate 
cost of a potentially vast private class action for damages (x).  
(2) For the same reasons as above, the incentives for the other members to apply 
for leniency are proportionally reduced as not only is the loss of turnover 
they will suffer much larger than A’s (R 100 000 000), but they too are faced 
with the indeterminate cost of a potentially vast private class action for 
damages (x) which is likely to be even larger civil class action than A. The 
other members are therefore less likely to apply for leniency, which in turn 
makes A less likely to apply for leniency, and so on. 
Therefore the effect of allowing the common law class action to operate against 
a firm, regardless of whether they have been granted immunity or not, is to quash the 
three pillars referred to above, rendering the most important tool in the public 
enforcement of the Act against Cartel conduct ineffective. This is an unacceptable 
result. 
 THE NEED FOR REFORM 
I. Introduction  
The introduction of the common law class action by way of the court’s decision in 
Children’s Resource Centre, has resulted in the judiciary acting in defiance of the 
express recommendation of the Law Commission, who stated in their Report that in 
their opinion (which I share) the development of a class action outside of constitutional 
matters should not be left to the courts due to the propensity for the various courts (and 
even individual judges)257 to follow approaches in relation to the concept of a class 
action which lack uniformity and consistency.258  
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Furthermore, the introduction of the common law class action, while failing to 
exclude the possibility of instituting a private action for damages against a successful 
leniency applicant, has resulted in the introduction of the common law class action 
operating (albeit unintentionally) to reduce the ‘effectiveness of cartel enforcement 
through altering the incentives to apply for leniency.’259 
II. The Introduction of a Statutory Class Action 
For the reasons above, I submit that there is a need for the introduction of a class action 
by way of statute, or Rule of Court, which abolishes the common law class action. 
Such an adoption would ensure that procedure surrounding the institution class actions 
outside of constitutional matters does not receive the same level of contention that the 
Rules 23 requirements for certification have received in America.  
A statutory class action for damages would allow for the institution of class 
actions to be effective and efficient. A knock-on effect hereof, is that due to the fact 
that the private enforcement of the Act plays a major role in the effective and efficient 
operation of the CLP, increased effectiveness and efficiency thereof, will translate into 
increased effectiveness and efficiency in the enforcement of the CLP. 
 However, such an introduction would not alter the present position regarding 
the threat posed by private class actions for damages to the public enforcement of the 
Act. And for that reason, I will not undertake to discuss the possibility of introducing 
a statutory class action any further. 
III. The Introduction of a Statutory Reference to the CLP, and the 
Exclusion of Private Actions for Damages Against a Successful 
Leniency Applicant 
The first proposed amendment that I will discuss introduces a statutory reference to 
the CLP into the Act. The aim of this is to establish an express statutory reference to 
the conditions and requirements of the CLP which must be satisfied in order for a 
leniency applicant to be granted Total Immunity. The second proposed amendment 
will then exclude the possibility of instituting private actions for damages against cartel 
                                                 
 




members who have been granted Total Immunity in terms of the first proposed 
amendment. 
These amendments are therefore aimed at establishing certainty as to the 
procedure that is to be followed when granting immunity. They are also aimed at 
ensuring that the effective operation of the CLP is not undermined. I propose that they 
will achieve this in the following way:  
(1) Transparency and predictability is restored to the process. If the threat of 
civil proceedings is removed, potential applicants no longer have to factor in 
the unknown costs which surround facing a civil claim into their decision of 
whether to apply for leniency or not, and can therefore better predict the 
consequences of their application for leniency, as well as the failure to do so.  
(2) The threat of detection is heightened. By providing cartel members the 
possibility of avoiding civil damages claims (which as was seen in the 
American experience, constitute severe monetary sanctions), a large 
incentive is created to self-report, which heightens the threat of detection 
through the self-reporting of another cartel member.  
(3) By providing reprieve from the severe monetary sanctioning (both 
administrative penalties and civil damages) only to a successful applicant, 
the enforcement and deterrent function of the monetary sanction is 
maintained, and the monetary sanction therefore incentivises cartel members 
to apply for leniency.  
 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE ACT: 
I. Definitions: 
‘Corporate Leniency Policy’: 
The policy sets out the benefits, procedure and requirements for co-operation with the 
Commission in exchange for immunity.260 
‘Immunity’: 
                                                 
 




Immunity in this context means that the Commission would not subject the successful 
applicant261 to adjudication262 before the Tribunal for its involvement in the cartel 
activity, which is part of the application under consideration. Furthermore, the 
Commission would not propose to have any fines imposed on that successful 
applicant.263 
‘Conditional Immunity’: 
This is given to an applicant at the initial stage of the application so as to create a good 
atmosphere and trust between the applicant and the Commission pending the 
finalisation of the infringement proceedings. This is done in writing between the 
applicant and the Commission signalling that immunity has been provisionally 
granted.264 
Total Immunity: 
Once the Tribunal or the Appeal Court, as the case may be, has reached a final decision 
in respect of the alleged cartel, Total Immunity is granted to a successful applicant 
who has fully met all the conditions and requirements under the CLP.265 
‘No immunity’: 
This applies in those cases where the applicant fails to meet the conditions and 
requirements under the CLP.266 
II. The Introduction of Section 49E. Leniency Agreements 
(1) If before, during, on or after the completion of the investigation of a complaint, the 
Competition Commission grants the applicant ‘Conditional Immunity’ in terms of 
the ‘Corporate Leniency Policy’(CLP)- 
(a) Once the Tribunal or the Appeal Court, as the case may be, after it has 
reached a final decision in respect of the alleged cartel, the Competition 
Commission must: 
                                                 
 
261 Successful applicant means a firm that meets all the conditions and requirements under the CLP 
262 Adjudication means a referral of a contravention of chapter 2 to the Tribunal by the Commission 
with a view of getting a prescribed fine imposed on the wrongdoer. Prosecution has a similar import 
to adjudication herein. 
263 South African Competition Commission op cit (n3) at para 3.3 
264 South African Competition Commission op cit (n3) at para 9.1.1 
265 South African Competition Commission op cit (n3) at para 9.1.2 




(i) Grant ‘Total Immunity’ to a successful applicant who has fully met all 
the conditions and requirements under the CLP. 
(ii) Grant ‘No immunity’ where the applicant fails to meet the conditions 
and requirements under the CLP. 
III. The Amendment of Section 65. Civil Actions and Jurisdiction 
(1) A person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of a prohibited practice- 
(a) may not commence an action in a civil court for the assessment of the amount 
or awarding of damages- 
(i) if that person has been awarded damages in a consent order confirmed 
in terms of section 49D(1); 
(ii) if the person against whom they wish to institute action has been 
granted Total Immunity in terms of section 49E(1). 
(b) if entitled to commence an action referred to in paragraph (a), when 
instituting proceedings, must file with the Registrar or Clerk of the Court a 
notice from the Chairperson of the Competition Tribunal, or from the Judge 
President of the Competition Appeal Court, in the prescribed form – 
(i) certifying that the conduct constituting the basis for the action has been 
found to be a prohibited practice in terms of this Act; 
(ii) stating the date of the Tribunal or Competition Appeal Court finding; 
and 
(iii) setting out the section of this Act in terms of which the Tribunal or the 
Competition Appeal Court made its finding. 
 CONCLUSION 
It has been shown that the private enforcement of any CLP is necessary in order for a 
CLP to provide an effective and efficient means of enforcing antitrust legislation. 
Furthermore, the aggregation of such private claims (by way of class action) is 
necessary in order for such claims to be justiciable. The recognition of a class action 
for damages outside of constitutional matters, is thus necessary in order to ensure that 




However, the introduction of a class action for damages outside of constitutional 
matters in the manner and form chosen by the Children’s Resource Centre has 
undermined the effective operation of the CLP in a number of respects:  
(1) The failure to introduce a class action by way of statute has created the 
problem of inconsistency and a lack of uniformity arising regarding the 
procedure for their institution.  
(2) The failure to make specific reference to the CLP in the Act creates 
uncertainty as to the interaction between the CLP, the Act, and common 
law class actions.  
(3) The failure to exclude the possibility of instituting a private action for 
damages against a party granted Total Immunity has resulted in the 
common law class action forming a deterrent to applying for leniency. 
I submit that given the significance of the CLP as a tool for combatting cartel 
conduct, that the resultant effect on its effective operation is untenable, and that the 
proposals submitted above in chapter 6 must be adopted by the legislature, in order to 
correct this position. This position having been corrected, the private enforcement 
mechanisms (class action claims for damages) of the Act will be reconcilable with the 
public enforcement mechanisms (the CLP), and the CLP will enable the competition 
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FiH Large,t Private Cartel Damage, Janua ry 1990-July 2012 ($ million,) 
CarteJJMarket Name, NominQ] S T otall Sales Date Increase in amount I otal (52011) recon red (puunmg€ Place nullion (percenl4ge) Settled of 52012) 
B:m.k cards' tr;msaction 
fee, 3("Merch.mt 
Discount") 
7,800 2.4 2012 7800 15.1 3 
Bank cards' transaction 
fee, 2 ("AMEX & 
Disoover") 
6650 11 .7 2008 6775 42.57 
B:m..k card3' trans action 
fee, 1 ("Wal-Mart" ca5e) 3383 L2 2003 4752 67J8 
T obaoco Leaf 1850 11 .9 2000 2839 70.72 
Securities, NASDAQ 
1027 3.12 1998 1663 231 .27 market makers, US 
Cumulative recovered 
damages prior to 1998 300 NA NA 502 
Source: 1M. Connor '''Private Recoveries in lnt:emational Cartel Cases Worldwide: What do the Data ShowT AAl 
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